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Abstract
This paper studies the bank-sovereign link in a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium set-up with strategic default on public debt. Heterogeneous banks
give rise to an interbank market where government bonds are used as collateral.
A default penalty arises from a breakdown of interbank intermediation that
induces a credit crunch. Government borrowing under limited commitment is
costly ex ante as bank funding conditions tighten when the quality of collateral
drops. This lowers the penalty from an interbank freeze and feeds back into
default risk. The arising amplication mechanism propagates aggregate shocks
to the macroeconomy. The model is calibrated using Spanish data and is capable
of reproducing key business cycle statistics alongside stylized facts during the
European sovereign debt crisis.
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1 Introduction
The European sovereign debt crisis has highlighted the pivotal role of public debt
held by the domestic nancial sector in creating a bank-sovereign link that amplies
adverse shocks in the presence of scal stress. The close interdependence between
sovereign risk, nancial stability and economic activity exposed the fragility of public
debt positions in advanced economies. In particular, we make three observations
during the crisis: (i) Banks in countries with an elevated risk premium on government
debt underwent diculties in tapping wholesale funding markets. (ii) The interest
rates of the public and the private sector started to be highly correlated in countries
under scal stress. (iii) Countries in the euro area periphery in very deep recessions
experienced particularly strong increases in their yield spreads.
Until recently, the existing literature on strategic sovereign default has focused on
emerging market debt.1 In this paper, we attempt to close the gap in the quantitative-
theoretic literature by proposing a model of optimal sovereign default for advanced
economies. We use the model to answer the following question: What makes debt
positions in advanced and nancially developed economies vulnerable? We nd that
the adverse feedback loop in Europe can be rationalised by the concept of strategic
default and that ex ante spillovers from sovereign risk to nancial market allocations
are an important source of sovereign risk.
This paper makes three contributions. First, we nest a bank-sovereign link in a
quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setting that gives rise to an en-
dogenous penalty from defaulting.2 Based on the classic work of Eaton & Gersovitz
(1981), a model of strategic sovereign default in a small open economy is augmented
with a heterogeneous banking sector. Banks allocate nancial resources on a secured
interbank market where government bonds serve as collateral. The economic cost of
default is due to an ensuing credit crunch in response to an interbank market freeze
as collateral looses its market value.3 In line with previous ndings, the penalty works
as a powerful enforcement mechanism which is able to support higher debt levels com-
pared to related quantitative frameworks.4 Thereby, the model is able to rationalise
higher debt levels and lower frequencies of default that are typically observed in nan-
cially developed, advanced economies. While the described mechanism is not limited
to advanced economies, we nd, similar to Gennaioli et al. (2014), that the penalty is
higher for nancially more developed economies.
Second, we formalise an amplication mechanism that arises from endogenously
evolving sovereign risk. A deterioration of the quality of underlying collateral assets
gives rise to a risk premium that pushes up bank funding costs and dampens nancial
intermediation (Barro 1976). Sovereign risk propagates into higher costs of external
nance for the non-nancial sector, in turn curbing private credit demand and de-
1Arellano (2008) and Aguiar & Gopinath (2006) are seminal studies in this eld.
2There is a long academic debate on the enforcement problem of government debt. In recent work,
endogenous penalties have gained more attention compared to reputational arguments as presented
in Bulow & Rogo (1989), Cole & Kehoe (1998), and Grossman & van Huyck (1988), among others.
3Empirical ndings of Dell'ariccia et al. (2005) document a domestic credit crunch in response to
a banking crisis which lowers aggregate production.
4See Dooley (2000) and Kumhof & Tanner (2008).
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pressing aggregate output. As a result, the penalty from the collapse of the interbank
market turns less painful in relative terms during times of scal stress, feeding back
into an increase of sovereign risk.5
Third, we calibrate the model using Spanish data. The quantitative simulation
exercise shows that the model is capable of reproducing key business cycle statistics
alongside the stylised facts from above. Although the quantitative predictions of the
model are broadly in line with the results from the literature on sovereign default
in emerging markets, there are three dierences in comparison to the Argentinian
default of 2001 that has often served as an example of an emerging market sovereign
default. Calibrated to an advanced and nancially developed economy, we nd that
(i) recessions preceding a default event are more severe in advanced economies; (ii)
there is a stronger impact eect of default on output; (iii) recessions last longer after
a default. Thus, the model is supporting the view of long-lasting nancial recessions
(Cerra & Saxena 2008) as opposed to a strong recovery observed in the follow-up to
emerging market debt crises (Calvo et al. 2006). High persistence and slow recovery
are related to banks' need to accumulate collateral from retained earnings during the
post-default period.
The paper mainly contributes to three branches of the existing literature. First, we
follow Mendoza & Yue (2012) in breaking the disconnect between sovereign default
risk and the business cycle in a quantitative setting. The trade-o inherent to the
default decision in their model is linked to the trade sector that depends on access to
foreign nance. We extend their analysis by structurally modelling a banking sector
that determines domestic borrowing conditions of the private sector. The model's
propagation mechanism leads to a co-movement of private and public sector interest
rates during a debt crisis. This result sheds new insights on the countercyclical nature
of interest rates, as previously analysed by Neumeyer & Perri (2005) and Uribe & Yue
(2006). Fernandez & Gulan (2012) explain counter-cyclical private sector interest rates
by nancial frictions on the side of entrepreneurs. We separate from their work by
providing a dierent explanation through the interaction of the enforcement problem
on the government side with frictions in the banking sector.
Second, our interpretation of the bank-sovereign link is motivated by the role of
government debt in providing liquidity services to the banking sector, as stressed by
Woodford (1990). According to this view, private agents are liquidity constrained
insofar as they cannot pledge the entire future income stream from protable projects
in order to obtain external nance. It is the highly liquid claim on government bonds
that enables these constrained rms to obtain additional external funds to increase
the size of their portfolio. The resulting non-Ricardian eects of government debt
are usually attributed with welfare improvements, since an expansion of government
borrowing increases the amount of securities available to liquidity constrained rms
as in Holmstrom & Tirole (1998) or Gorton & Ordo~nez (2013). However, this body
of literature typically assumes that the government can perfectly commit to repay its
outstanding debt. Recent events in the euro area have illustrated that this is not
necessarily the case. In this paper, we allow for limited enforcement of government
5Note that no bailout of the nancial sector is needed in this set-up to amplify sovereign risk,
contrary to the framework of Acharya et al. (2014).
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debt that turns liquidity services from government securities into a state dependent
general equilibrium outcome.
There have been a number of recent studies on the bank-sovereign link, mostly in
non-stochastic models without reference to the business cycle. Within this literature,
we are closest to Brutti (2011), Bolton & Jeanne (2011), and Niemann & Pichler (2013)
who also account for a liquidity role for government bonds under sovereign risk. We
extend this strand of literature by providing a quantication of the liquidity channel in
a calibrated and simulated framework at the backdrop of the European sovereign debt
crisis. Further, we are more specic on the propagation mechanism by structurally
modelling an interbank market. This gives rise to several channels that have been
discussed by policymakers during the crisis.
The spillover mechanism from sovereign risk to nancial intermediaries is related to
the bank capital channel that also creates an ex post penalty from sovereign default.
Gennaioli et al. (2014) propose a model where the size of the default penalty is a
function of the quality of domestic nancial institutions, which allow domestic agents
to increase the leverage of their balance sheets and to accumulate more government
debt. Closely related is the analysis by Sandleris (2014). Acharya & Rajan (2013)
study a setting where government myopia helps to overcome the enforcement problem
in the presence of endogenous default penalties. Short-termism induces policymak-
ers to service debt today, whereas the adverse consequences of a write-down on the
domestic nancial system are shifted to the next political generation. Padilla (2013)
proposes a stochastic model of optimal sovereign default with an endogenous default
penalty due to a bank capital channel that is calibrated to the case of Argentina in
2001. The liquidity channel analysed here separates from the bank capital channel in
that it induces an ex ante cost of sovereign risk which is important for the dynamic
and quantitative results as it lowers the penalty and renders sovereign debt fragile
even in the presence of high endogenous penalties.
Third, the framework features bond market trading that gives rise to simultaneous
domestic and external debt positions in equilibrium. This is novel in the quantitative
literature on sovereign default, which has so far focused on either external or domes-
tic debt.6 Both the bank-sovereign link and the possibility of bond market trading
aect default incentives and aggregate uctuations through domestic accumulation of
government securities. Since the government cannot discriminate between individual
bond holders, bond market trading gives rise to non-penalty related incentives to re-
pay external creditors, as the undesirable consequences of defaulting on domestic bond
holders are internalised, similar to the political economy model of external and domes-
tic sovereign debt by Guembel & Sussman (2009). More generally, the bond market
in our framework works in support of the repayment equilibrium and is therefore in
line with the secondary bond market hypothesis developed by Broner et al. (2010).
The next section presents a novel set of stylised facts regarding sovereign risk and
interbank markets in the euro area and discusses its parallels with business cycles in
emerging markets. Section 3 contains a detailed description of the model. We discuss
6Technical motives might be the main reason for this neglect, as the global solution technique
restricts the amount of endogenous state variables. At the same time, this is surprising as Reinhart
& Rogo (2011) document that domestic public debt ranges between 40 and 80 percent of total public
debt in a broad sample of advanced and emerging market countries.
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the model mechanics of the bank-sovereign link and spillovers to feasible allocations in
Section 4. Section 5 documents the quantitative results and the nal section concludes.
2 Stylized facts on the bank-sovereign link in the
euro area
In this section we highlight three stylized facts about the European sovereign debt
crisis. The rst stylized fact focuses on the bank-sovereign channel in the euro area
in the light of structural changes in bank nancing patterns. As a consequence of the
global nancial crisis, European interbank short-term funding increasingly shifted from
unsecured to secured (repo) interbank markets (European Central Bank 2012). From
the peak volume of unsecured lending traded in 2007, total market turnover shrank
by more than 30 percent in the four years through 2011 (Figure 1a). Over the same
time period, the repo market was comparatively stable such that it developed into the
major interbank market for wholesale funding (European Central Bank 2013). The
behavioural changes undergoing bank funding structures in Europe since the burst
of the subprime bubble were primarily related to an elevated level of counter-party
risk. In the presence of asymmetric information about banks' idiosyncratic risk char-
acteristics, collateral is a way to overcome agency problems underlying the interbank
market. In a nutshell, a repo agreement replaces the counter-party default risk by the
less likely event that the counter-party defaults and, simultaneously, the underlying
collateral looses its value. For this reason, collateral used in private repo markets are
usually high quality and liquid assets. In fact, more than 90 percent of collateral assets
in European repo arrangements are securities backed by central governments (ICMA
2013).
With an intensication of the euro area debt crisis in the course of 2009-10, gov-
ernment securities from countries under an assistance programme were no longer ac-
cepted in European repo markets (Figure 1b).7 The increase in sovereign default risk
triggered an adverse collateral channel at a time when structural shifts toward more
secured funding were taking place in the European banking sector.8 As a result, banks
in countries with scal stress underwent diculties in tapping wholesale funding mar-
kets (fact 1 ). Some countries suered practically an interbank freeze for both, secured
and unsecured funding, and had to revert to central bank liquidity (Figure 1c).9
In the second half of 2011, repo market conditions for remaining euro area countries
under scal stress tightened as well, as repo rates against collateral issued in core and
periphery member countries started to diverge (Figure 1d). Specically, the spread
between the EONIA swap rate and the general collateral (GC) repo rate from France
and Germany turned negative in the second half of 2011, while they were surging in
7Financial sector rescue packages in October 2008 contributed to the initial increase in public
sector default risk in the European sovereign debt crisis as documented by Ejsing & Lemke (2011).
8Gorton & Metrick (2012) nd evidence that the U.S. nancial crisis similarly unfolded through
a "run on repo" markets, where previously as safe regarded assets where subject to re-evaluations of
risk.
9Giannone et al. (2012) provide a detailed empirical analysis on how the ECB's non-standard
monetary policy interventions were replacing private intermediation on the interbank market.
4
Figure 1: The collateral channel of sovereign risk
(a) Interbank turnover

































































(d) GC repo rate




















(e) Growth and default risk

































Notes: Panel (a) - Turnover formed as sum over lending and borrowing from ECB's money market
survey. Panel (c) - Degree of public intermediation evaluated as percentage share of 'Lending to
credit institutions related to monetary policy operations' and 'Other claims on euro area residents
in euros' from NCB balance sheets over 'Total liabilities' from aggregate MFI balance sheets. Panel
(e) - Dotted line includes data point for Greece. Source: ECB, ICMA, Bloomberg, NCBs, OECD,
Thomson Reuters Datastream.
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Figure 2: Interest rates in the euro area
(a) Greece







35 corr = 0.85804
(b) Portugal





































































Note: Interest rates in levels. Black lines with dot = Government bond yields from 10
year benchmark bond; Green lines with cross = bank lending rates to non-nancial
rms, maturity up to 1 year. Correlations computed over the period 2009q3-2011q4.
Source: ECB, Thomson Reuters Datastream.
Spain and Italy. Thus, the lower credit quality of government securities translated
into more costly liquidity services on repo markets.10
The second stylized fact relates to an amplication mechanism arising from the
collateral channel: With a deteriorating collateral value of government bonds in the
presence of a strong home-bias in government bond portfolios (Arslanalp & Tsuda
2012), the collateral channel contributed to the overall increase in funding costs in
the euro area periphery (BIS 2011). Higher funding costs for banks in the periphery
translated into higher interest rates on loans to the non-nancial sector.
The interest rates of the public and the private sector started to be highly correlated
with the onset of the Greek debt crisis in the second half of 2009 (fact 2, Figure 2).
This correlation was previously documented by Mendoza & Yue (2012) in connection
with foreign interest rates for a sample of 18 emerging market economies over the entire
business cycle. In the context of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, it is the domestic
10This phenomenon is related to ight-to-liquidity eects as described by Beber et al. (2009) for
European government bond markets. However, while Beber et al. focus on asset liquidity in terms
of its resaleability, we concentrate on liquidity services generated through the collateral value of an
asset.
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bank lending rate that turned out to be positively correlated with sovereign default
risk due to the bank-sovereign link which unfolds, among others, via the collateral
channel.
The third stylized fact is addressing the interaction of the bank-sovereign link with
macroeconomic uctuations. Overall economic performance seems to have played a
major role in the further escalation of the sovereign debt crisis. Figure 1e) shows a
strong negative correlation between average quarterly growth rates over the 2010 to
2011 period and average CDS yields. Countries in the euro area periphery in very
deep recessions experienced particular strong increases in sovereign default risk (fact
3 ). This comes as little surprise given that the sovereign debt crisis developed into
a systemic crisis. In the next section, we present a model that explains the stylized
facts presented here by emphasising the collateral role of government securities in the
nancial system of an economy.
3 Model environment
3.1 Overview
The core of the model is a small open economy real business cycle model with a
benevolent government subject to a limited commitment friction that gives rise to
endogenous risk of sovereign default. The novel block is a heterogeneous banking
sector that intermediates nancial resources on domestic interbank and credit markets,
thereby providing working capital loans to non-nancial rms. Government bonds are
used as collateral on the interbank market.





, where Bt denotes total outstanding government debt, B
D
t is domesti-
cally accumulated collateral on bank balance sheets, and At an exogenous aggregate






are given from period t   1
decisions. When the productivity shock realizes at the beginning of the period, the
government takes its binary default decision t 2 f0; 1g as the outcome of an opti-
mization problem. In case of default, the economy falls into nancial autarky with a
stochastic probability of re-entering capital markets in period t+ 1. There is no debt
trading in the autarky state. In the no-default equilibrium, domestic banks interme-
diate funds on interbank and credit markets to non-nancial rms. Interbank lending
is subject to nancial frictions that interact with sovereign risk. For simplicity, we
assume that lending from banks to rms occurs without frictions with non-contingent
debt contracts. Primary and secondary bond market trading evolves simultaneously
and determines the asset position of the government and banks in the consecutive
period.11
11We use bond market trading and secondary bond market trading interchangeably in this paper.
A detailed overview on the timing of events is provided in the Appendix B.
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3.2 Households
A representative household derives utility from consumption and leisure. It owns do-
mestic rms and banks while receiving prots and dividends in a lump sum fashion at
the end of each period. The optimization problem of the household is static, choos-
ing optimal period t consumption and labour supply. We assume that the household
consumes all available resources according to its ow budget constraint. Consumption
smoothing over time can only be obtained by government transfers. We thereby fol-
low the motivation typically provided for government transfers through international
borrowing in the literature on optimal sovereign default.12 The household maximizes







s.t. Ct = WtLt +t +Dt + Tt; (1)
where Et is the rational expectations operator, Ct denotes consumption and  is the
discount factor. Time available to households is normalised to one unit such that
1   Lt and Lt denote leisure and hours worked, respectively. The utility function
U : R2+ ! R is twice continuously dierentiable in both its arguments, and satises
UC > 0, UCC < 0, UL < 0 and ULL < 0. Wt is the real wage that is exogenous from
the perspective of the representative household. t denote non-nancial rms' prots,
Dt are banking sector dividend payments, and Tt lump-sum government transfers or
taxes. Labour supply is pinned down by the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labour equated with the real wage:
 UL(Ct; 1  Lt)
UC(Ct; 1  Lt) = Wt (2)
3.3 Non-nancial rms
There is a competitive non-nancial sector in the economy which produces a trade-
able nal good with a Cobb-Douglas production function. Prots are maximized by
the choice of labour input at a constant capital stock K. A fraction  > 0 of the
wage bill needs to be paid to workers up-front at the beginning of each period prior
to production. Since non-nancial rms are liquidity constrained and do not have
the possibility to save, they obtain credit t from domestic banks at the endogenous
interest rate rt .
13 The representative non-nancial rm's prot maximisation problem
12Among others, Aguiar & Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008) use household consumption
smoothing to motivate government borrowing. An alternative motivation for international borrowing
is to smooth government expenditures, see Cuadra et al. (2010).
13The implied assumption is that domestic rms do not access international capital markets for
credit. This seems justied by the fact that (i) rms in the euro area are typically bank nanced,











s.t. t  WtLt: (4)
Since working capital is costly, the constraint in equation (4) holds with equality
in equilibrium. The resulting rst-order condition for labour demand equates the
marginal product of labour to the marginal cost which consists of the wage rate plus
nancing costs from working capital borrowing.14
(1  )eAtKL t =Wt(1 + rt ) (5)
The only aggregate uncertainty is due to a stationary autoregressive process of order
one for total factor productivity At
At = At 1 + "t; (6)
with 0 <  < 1 and white noise process "t  N (0; 2").
3.4 Banks
Financial intermediation is motivated by the need for external nance of the non-
nancial sector.15 The banking sector is assumed to be of measure one and populated
by an innite number of banks i 2 [0; 1]. Banks enter period t with previously ac-
cumulated government bonds BDt as well as a constant and exogenous amount N of
household deposits. From an accounting identity perspective, it follows that collateral
assets form bank equity Kbt . Banks are endowed with retail deposits N in the initial
period and pass them from one period to the next as cash holdings Cmt .
16
We follow the idea of temporary market segmentation in order to motivate an inter-
bank market (e.g. Gertler & Kiyotaki, 2011). Banks exhibit within-period heterogene-
ity of two dierent types  2 fp; ug. At an exogenously given probability p, a bank
turns into a productive bank of type p. This bank is matched with a non-nancial rm
to which it is able to extend credit t at the endogenously determined interest rate
rt . To this end, bank p uses its own liquid liabilities N
p. Additionally, it can borrow
funds at the domestic interbank market Mt. Working capital and interbank funding
are intra-period loans that mature at the end of period t.
In case a bank borrows from the interbank market, we assume that it accumulates
14See Uribe & Yue (2006) for an extensive discussion of the interest rate on working capital as an
intra-period loan contract.
15We abstract from a microfoundation of the intermediary. Diamond (1984) provides a theory for
the existence of nancial intermediaries due to a cost advantage in monitoring.
16As the focus of the paper is the adjustment of bank balance sheets through changes in wholesale
funding from the interbank market, we leave the adjustment of retail deposits for future research.
Further, we are restricted in the amount of state variables due to the numerical solution method.
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excess reserves Ret . This captures the self-insurance motive against costly liquidity





with  > 1. Demand for excess reserves induces a spread in the credit rate over bank
funding costs, as they convey opportunity costs to productive banks.
A bank turns into an unproductive bank, or type u, with complement probability
u = 1  p. Type u banks do not have the opportunity to provide loans to the non-
nancial sector. Instead, they oer their resources as interbank loans to type p banks at
the interbank market rate rMt . As productive banks are short of funding in equilibrium
for many states of the world, the interbank market gives rise to a reallocation of funds
across banks.
Finally, banks of both types may store cash within a period in the central bank's
deposit facility, Rd;t . Excess reserves and cash stored in the deposit facility are re-
munerated at a constant exogenous rate rR. Bank balance sheets are summarized in
Table 1, where total reserves are denoted by Rt .
Table 1: Bank balance sheets
productive (p) unproductive (u)
intra-period t















end of period t













Interbank loans need to be collateralised at a constant haircut of size .18 The only
available collateral in the model economy are government securities which take the
form of one-period discount bonds.19 The government cannot commit to repay. A
bond issued in period t  1 contains a promise by the government to repay one unit of
17However, we do not model a maturity mismatch that would give rise to roll-over risk on the
interbank market here. Costly liquidity shortfall in the banking sector under stochastic liability
withdrawals has been modelled in Poole (1968) or Baltensperger (1980), among others. Chari et al.
(1995) use a similar reduced form for demand in excess reserves in a macro setting.
18The collateral requirement on the interbank market is introduced ad hoc for simplicity. It is pos-
sible to derive an incentive compatibility constraint similar to equation (8) from an agency problem.
One possibility is that the borrowing bank p is limited to pledge future income for repayment on its
liabilities Mt to type u banks due to moral hazard as shown by Holmstrom & Tirole (1998).
19This assumption is in line with empirical regularities in the euro area as discussed in Section 2.
Further, Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) document that US-Treasuries are close substi-
tutes to money due to their high liquidity and safety. With this property, government debt features
low information sensitivity which makes it a preferred choice for collateral (Dang et al. 2013).
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the numeraire good in period t, conditional on not defaulting. Let t 2 f0; 1g denote
the period t default decision of the government, where repayment is given by t = 0.
The government's default decision is taken as exogenous from the bank perspective.
Further, let BD;t denote collateral accumulated on bank balance sheet of type  . Then,
the period t value of government bonds held by banks is (1   t)BD;t such that the
collateral constraint takes the form:





We use the result of Barro (1976) who shows that the price for a collateralised debt
contract accounts for the quality of the underlying collateral.20 To this end, let 	(qt)
denote a risk premium on secured interbank contracts that is assumed to be decreasing
in the price of government bonds qt.
Banks purchase government securities on bond markets at price qt. In line with the
literature, we dene government assets as net borrowing of the sovereign, Bt < 0. Gov-
ernment bonds are either held domestically by the banking sector, or internationally









t+1  0 (9)
such that  qtBt+1 = qt(Bt+1 + BDt+1) denotes the net foreign asset position of the
economy.
Each bank maximizes discounted expected lifetime dividend payments to the repre-









where the choice variables depend on the idiosyncratic realization of types  2 fp; ug.
We exploit the recursive structure of the model to rewrite the problem in Bellman
form. The maximization problem for a bank of type p reads




t ; At) + 
bEt
W(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1)	 ;
with dividends dened as
Dpt = (1  t)BD;pt +(1+ rt )t  (1+ rMt )Mt+(1+ rR)Rpt   (1  t)~qtBD;pt+1  Np: (10)
20In Barro (1976), contract parties account for the eective interest rate by internalising the proba-
bility of collateral exchange in the event of a counter-party default. However, allowing for equilibrium
interbank default that leads to the exchange of collateral is beyond the scope of this paper.
21Using the stochastic discount factor of the representative household would distort the collateral
accumulation decision of banks, since models with sovereign default feature low values for  to account
for default in equilibrium, see Mendoza & Yue (2012).
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The bank p objective function is subject to (7), (8), and the following constraints:










t  0 (13)
The ow of funds constraint (11) illustrates that an increase in credit t beyond the
liquid resources Np requires interbank borrowing. Total reserves held by a productive
bank Rpt are either excess reserves, or cash stored in the deposit facility (12). The
non-negativity constraint on the deposit facility (13) implies that there is no direct
funding available from the central bank.
The collateral constraint (8) constitutes an occasionally binding borrowing con-
straint. Productive banks can obtain additional funding only up to a multiple  of
the market value of government securities currently on their balance sheet. As nan-
cial sector holding of government debt is an endogenous state variable, this constraint
establishes the inter-temporal dimension of the banks' problem. Particularly, banks
are trading-o dividend payments today against future dividend payments. The bank
cannot purchase more public securities than there are cash-ows available in period t
(13).
The maximization problem of type u banks takes the form




t ; At) + 
bEt
W(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1)	 ;
with dividends dened as
Dut = (1  t)BD;ut + (1 + rMt )Mt + (1 + rR)Rut   (1  t)~qtBD;pt+1  Nu (14)









t  0 (17)
Equation (15) constitutes the ow of funds constraint. Bank u reserves are dened by
its use of the central bank deposit facility (16). As in the problem of type p banks,
additional funds from the central bank are not available, and collateral purchases are
constrained by the non-negativity constraint on dividends (17).
As period t+1 types are unknown and probabilities are identically and independently
distributed, expected future dividend payments are formed using the unconditional
probability for each type in the consecutive period:
Et
W(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1) = Et pWp(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1) + uWu(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1)
Forming the Lagrangian for both types of banks, the rst-order conditions for credit,
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excess reserves and collateral of productive banks read22
rt = r









WBD(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1)+ D;pt ; (20)
Optimal supply of working capital credit from (18) implies that the type p bank wants
to increase its lending to non-nancial rms as long as it earns at least a return of rR,
which constitutes the opportunity investment within period t. pt denotes the Lagrange
multiplier on the ow of funds constraint. The optimal amount of wholesale funding
(19) accounts for the cost of funding rMt and the foregone prots due to additional
excess reserves which lower funds available for credit by 1=. The Lagrange multiplier
on the collateral constraint t captures whether further interbank borrowing is feasible.
Equation (20) is the pricing equation for government bonds at secondary bond markets
which is discussed below.
Optimization of type u banks yield as rst-order conditions
rMt = r





WBD(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1)+ D;ut ; (22)
Optimal supply of interbank loans in (21) states that the interbank rate rMt makes
type u banks indierent between investing in excess reserves or interbank loans. In
equilibrium, unproductive banks are competing for loan demand on the interbank
market such that ut = 0 and r
M
t = r
R + 	(qt). The bond pricing equation (22) is
discussed below.
The complementary slackness conditions for the inequality constraints of the bank-
ing sector are the following set of equations
t






t ) = 0 8 2 fp; ug (24)
D;t (0 +D










D;8 2 fp; ug denote the Lagrange multipliers on the collateral con-
straint, the non-negativity constraints on central bank deposits and dividends, respec-
tively.
In order to arrive at the aggregate equilibrium allocations in the model economy
across banking types, we use the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (Aggregation) Under the assumption of equal collateral holdings of
banks in the initial period t = 0, there exists a representative bank for each type
 2 fp; ug such that the equilibrium allocations can be derived from the representative
22See Appendix C for a detailed derivation of the results.
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BDt ;  2 fp; ug
Proof. See Appendix A.
From Proposition 1 follows that no subscripts for individual banks are required in
equations (10)-(13), and (14)-(17). Aggregate dividend payments to households are




t and, accordingly, for central





Turning now to the dynamic part of the bank decision problem, note that the pricing
decisions (20) and (22) for collateral at government bond markets are identical across
bank types due to the independent and identical probability of turning into a produc-
tive bank in the consecutive period. The envelope condition forWBD(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1)
yields
WBD(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1) =p(1  t+1 + t+1) + u(1  t+1) + Dt
=1  t+1 + pt+1 + Dt
such that the pricing equation for collateral assets from both types of banks takes the
form
~qt = 
b(1  t ) + pbEt(t+1) + Dt + B
D
t ; (27)
where Et(t+1) = 

t denotes the default probability of government bonds in period
t+1, evaluated at the period t information set. The pricing equation (27) is composed
of four parts. First, the bank prices the bond according to its discounted expected
pay-os from repayment in period t + 1. Second, with probability p a bank will
be of type p in period t + 1 and, hence, is able to increase lending to non-nancial
rms if it holds additional collateral. We restate this analytical result in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. (Liquidity premium) Due to liquidity services derived from holding
government bonds as collateral on the interbank market, banks' asset pricing equation
on public debt yields a liquidity premium, denoted as ^t, in the form:
^t  pbEt (t+1)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The two last terms in equation (27) relate to corner solutions on the government
bond market in case of binding constraints, either due to non-negative dividend pay-
ments, or due to total outstanding public securities from (9). Banks take the total
outstanding amount of government debt as given and may run into the problem of low
supply of government bonds such that B
D
t > 0.
As international investors have unlimited funds, banks take the price for public
securities qt as given. The following proposition describes the supply and demand of
government bonds from international investors:
14
Proposition 3. Risk-neutral international investors exhibit a perfectly elastic supply
and demand function of government bonds on secondary bond markets at price qt.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Let F(Bt; BDt ; At) = BDt+1 j Bt+1 denote the demand function for domestically held
debt conditional on the total amount of newly issued government securities. Demand
from banks is pinned down by the no-arbitrage condition from equation (27) while
taking prices as given from Proposition 3, hence
~qt   qt = 0
, b(1  t ) + pbEt(t+1) + Dt + B
D
t   qt = 0;
Banks purchase government debt up to the amount where they expect zero liquidity
premium on additional collateral holding, if unconstrained by their respective ow
budget constraint or the short-selling constraint.











Figure 3 illustrates the possible equilibria on the market for government debt. Inter-
national investors' supply curve is perfectly elastic at the market price qt and given by
S (Proposition 3). Domestic banks take the bond price as given and have a downward
sloping demand for collateral (DA), which is due to a decreasing expected liquidity
value for collateral, @
2^t
@BDt+1
< 0. An interior solution on the interval BDt+1 2 (0; Bt+1)
is found if ~qt = qt and no constraint is binding (A), or if the accumulation of collat-
eral is limited by the non-negativity requirement for dividend payments (A0). Corner
solutions are realized if demand for collateral assets is exceeding total supply (B). In
this case, total public debt is held domestically. The opposite case is given if domestic
banks have a very low expected collateral value in the consecutive period such that
~q < q (C).
3.5 Central bank
A central bank collects bank deposits and excess reserves from the domestic banking
system. All reserves are remunerated at a xed and exogenously given rate rR. To keep
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a clear focus of the analysis, we do not consider any form of central bank intervention.
Period t central bank prots amount to
cbt =  RtrR; (28)
which are transferred lump-sum to the government.
3.6 Partial equilibrium
We need to dene two types of partial equilibria. In the repayment equilibrium ab-
sent sovereign default, the partial equilibrium consists of market clearing quantities
and prices for the labour market, credit market, and the interbank market variables
fLt;Wt; rt ; rMt ; t;Mt; Ret ; Rd; ; Rt ; t; t g. Taking as given the aggregate state
s 2 (Bt; BDt ; At) and the price of government debt qt(Bt+1; BDt+1; At), the equations
(2), (4), (5), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), and (21), in combina-
tion with the complementary slackness conditions (23), (24), (26) solve the non-linear
system.
The inter-temporal collateral decision is derived as a reaction function conditional







are obtained from equations (25), (26), and (27). Finally, dividend
payments are derived from (10) and (14).
In the partial equilibrium under sovereign default, interbank market trading breaks
down as qt = 0, such that Mt = R
e
t = 0 follows jointly from the collateral constraint
and the liquidity preference. Hence, rMt and t remain undened and all resources of
unproductive banks are deposited at the central bank, Rd;ut = N
u. The solution to
the remaining partial equilibrium variables f Lt;Wt; rt ; t; Rd;pt ; Rpt ; pt g is given by
equations (2), (4), (5), (11), (12), (13), (18), in combination with the complementary
slackness conditions (24), (26) for  = p.
3.7 Government
There is a benevolent government in analogy to Eaton & Gersovitz (1981) that cannot
commit to repay its debt. Specically, the government chooses to default on the total
amount of outstanding debt if this is welfare maximizing in terms of household utility
given the aggregate state of the economy s 2 (Bt; BDt ; At). We look at equilibria where
the government cannot discriminate between foreign and domestic bond holders when
defaulting. Technically, the optimal default decision consists of maximizing the value
function
Vt(Bt; BDt ; At) = max
t2f0;1g
(1  )V ndt (Bt; BDt ; At) + tV dt (Bt; BDt ; At); (29)
where V ndt ; V
d
t denote the value of repayment and default, respectively.
In case the government decides to repay its debt obligations, it borrows from capital
markets by selling one period discount-bonds Bt+1 < 0 at the market price 0 < qt < 1.
This bond pays back Bt+1 units of consumption goods in period t+ 1, conditional on
16
not defaulting. Government borrowing serves a consumption smoothing purpose for




t + (Bt   qtBt+1)(1  t); (30)
where central bank prots cbt from equation (28) are consolidated in the government
budget constraint.
The government decides on its optimal debt policy and internalises the decentralised
collateral decision of the nancial sector by taking account of the reaction function
F(Bt; BDt ; At). Optimal new borrowing conditional on not defaulting maximizes the
following value function
V ndt (Bt; B
D





Vt+1(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1)f(At+1; At)dAt+1g;
subject to the aggregate resource constraint in the economy23
Ct = e
AtKL1 t + (Bt +B
D
t )  qt(Bt+1 +BDt+1)
= Yt  Bt + qtBt+1
and the set of partial equilibrium conditions under repayment as laid out in Section
3.6.
The trade-o for the optimal government debt policy is implied in the latter equa-
tion, where benets in terms of household utility from increases in net external debt
need to be weighted against the spillovers to aggregate production. Specically, the
collateral channel introduces an ambiguous sign on the reaction of output to an in-
crease in the total amount of outstanding debt. At very low levels of government
debt, an expansion of public borrowing leads to an increase in securities available to
the banking sector, thereby stimulating output. On the other side weighs the interac-
tion of sovereign risk with nancial frictions on the cost of working capital and output
if the level of public debt turns risky from the perspective of bond holders.
The government internalizes these externalities of its borrowing decision, which
might arise either from a drop in the bond price qt as a consequence of choosing high
debt levels, or from an overall scarcity of collateral from choosing very low debt levels.
Given that the government cannot remove the deep frictions inherent to the domes-
tic nancial sector, it achieves a constrained ecient outcome under the repayment
regime.
In line with the literature, investors penalise the government for defaulting by forcing
the economy into nancial autarky with a stochastic probability  > 0 of re-entering
capital markets. When regaining market access, the economy starts with zero govern-
23A formal derivation of the aggregate resource constraint is provided in Appendix C.
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ment bonds. The value of choosing default is dened by
V dt (Bt; B
D










subject to the set of partial equilibrium conditions without interbank trading from
Section 3.6 and the resource constraint under autarky:
Ct = Yt (31)
The default set  t is dened as the subset of the productivity state At for which the
value of defaulting is strictly higher than the value of repayment, given the endogenous





At 2 s : V dt (Bt; BDt ; At) > V ndt (Bt; BDt ; At)
	
Note that the default set is two-dimensional, meaning that the distance between the
value of repayment V nd and the value of default V d are aected not only by the level
of government debt Bt, but also by the amount of public debt held domestically, B
D
t .
We nd that the model with external and domestic debt preserves standard prop-
erties of quantitative models of sovereign default. Specically, the model conrms a
positive relationship between the total amount of outstanding debt with the probabil-
ity of default, given a productivity state At and domestic debt B
D
t+1.
Proposition 4. If default is optimal in state (At; B
D
t ) for B
2
t  j BDt j, default is
also optimal for B1t < B






Proof. See Appendix A.
Further, we extend this nding by the observation that the default set  t is shrinking
in the amount of debt held by the domestic banking sector.
Proposition 5. If default is optimal in state (At; Bt) for B
D;2
t  j Btj, default is also
optimal for BD;1t < B




Proof. See Appendix A.
The default probability is dened as the conditional cumulative probability density









International investors are risk neutral. The expected returns on the one-period dis-
count bond are denoted by Et(1   t+1), which are discounted by an exogenously
given risk-free investment opportunity with constant return rf . Government bonds




1  t (Bt+1; BDt+1; At)
1 + rf
: (32)
From the price of the one-period discount bond we extract the period t rate of return
on public debt as rgt  q 1t   1.
The eect of domestic government debt on the bond price follows jointly from Propo-
sition 5, the denition of the default probability and the asset pricing equation of
international investors (32):
Proposition 6. (i) Higher shares of total outstanding government debt purchased by
the domestic banking sector on the secondary bond market lowers the probability of a
sovereign default in period t+1, or formally t ( Bt+1; B
D;2
t+1 ; At)  t ( Bt+1; BD;1t+1 ; At) for
0 < BD;1t+1 < B
D;2
t+1  j Bt+1j. (ii) A higher share of total outstanding government debt
held by domestic banks lowers the spread on government bonds, i.e. qt( Bt+1; B
D;2
t+1 ; At)
 qt( Bt+1; BD;1t+1 ; At).
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.9 Equilibrium
We examine a Markov perfect equilibrium where the state vector s 2 (Bt; BDt ; At) is
sucient to dene the optimal policy by all agents in the model.
Denition. The model's recursive equilibrium is given by
1. Value functions V, V nd, and V d for the government;
2. Policy functions of the government's default decision t 2 f0; 1g, and future
borrowing Bt+1;
3. Policy functions for the private sector decisions on Ct, Lt, Mt, t, R

t ;
4. Bank policy function F for the inter-temporal decision on collateral purchases
and dividend payments BD;t+1 ; D

t ;
5. A bond pricing equation from international investors for qt;
such that given the government policies and the bond pricing equation, the household
policies for consumption and labour solve the household's problem; given productivity
and credit supply, the policies for labour and credit solve the prot maximizing prob-
lem of non-nancial rms; given the bond pricing equation and credit demand, the
banking sector decisions maximize nancial sector dividends and satisfy the market
clearing condition on secondary bond markets; the consumption plan Ct(Bt; B
D
t ; At)
satises the resource constraint of the economy; the transfer policy Tt(Bt; B
D
t ; At) sat-
ises the government budget constraint; given  t (Bt; B
D






bond pricing function qt(Bt+1,B
D
t+1,At) satises the no-arbitrage condition of foreign
lenders.
4 Analysis of the bank-sovereign link
4.1 Calibration and solution method
We use Spanish data at a quarterly frequency over the period 2000q1 to 2011q4 in
order to calibrate the model for the quantitative analysis. Although Spain did not
default on its securities during the European sovereign debt crisis, it was among the
group of countries that exhibited strong increases in country default risk that spilled
over to the domestic banking sector (Section 2). Therefore, we think that the case of
Spain provides a valuable testing ground to evaluate our model's propagation mech-
anism. We focus on the time period of membership within the European Monetary
Union (EMU) until the end of 2011 when the ECB took non-standard policy measures
at an unprecedented scale to stimulate the money market in order to alleviate the seg-
mentation of funding conditions along national borders within the EMU.24 Limiting
the analysis to this time period seems appropriate given that interventions from the
central bank are absent in our model environment.
For the calibration of the household utility function, we use preferences proposed
by Greenwood et al. (1988),





and we take common values from the literature to calibrate the degree of risk aversion
 = 2, and the wage elasticity of labour supply ! = 1:455. For the production function,
we set the capital share of output to  = 0:36 which is a standard value for models
calibrated to the euro area (Smets & Wouters 2002). The risk-free rate rf is set to
1.0 percent at a quarterly frequency. This value is widely used in the literature and
roughly in line with the average yield of German government bonds at a maturity of
10 years. Banks' discount factor is set to b = 1=(1 + rf ) such that the dierence in
valuation of government bonds between foreign investors and domestic banks is due
to liquidity services only. The probability of re-entry to international capital markets
after default is set to  = 0:083, which is taken from Richmond & Dias (2009), who
nd an average historical exclusion spell of three years for a cross-section of default
episodes since 1980 in emerging market economies.
We take the parameters related to the process of aggregate productivity directly
from Mendoza & Yue (2012), setting  = 0:95 and " = 1:7 percent. We interpret the
model predictions for aggregate volatility with caution, as the volatility properties of
our model are inuenced by the solution method as shown by Hatchondo et al. (2010).
Therefore, we do not target the standard deviation and autocorrelation of the cyclical
24Primarily, the ECB launched two long-term renancing operations with a maturity of three years
which took a volume of about 1000 billion euros). See the corresponding ECB announcement from
December 8th 2011, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208 1.en.html
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Table 2: Baseline calibration
Parameter Value Source/Target Data(a)
Capital share of output  0.36 Literature -
Risk aversion  2 Literature -
Wage elasticity of labor supply ! 1.455 Literature -
Riskfree rate rf 0.01 Literature -
Bank's discount factor b 0.99 1=(1 + rf ) -
Probability of reentry  0.083 Richmond & Dias (2009)
Persistence of TFP shock  0.95 Mendoza & Yue (2012)
Std.dev. of TFP shock " 0.017 Mendoza & Yue (2012)
Rate on central bank reserves rR 0.0077 rf   rR 23 bps
Cost function collateral  0.245 OLS estimate
Simulated Method of Moments
Household's discount factor  0.92 Default frequency 0:65%
Capital stock K 11.92 K=Y 3.47
Working capital requirement  1.074 =Y 0.68
Liquid liabilities N 2.97 r   rf 50 bps
Eciency parameter P  7.52 Re=(+M + qBD) 0.0153
Probability for lending bank p 0.568 M=Lbanks 0.20
Collateral requirement  0.257 BD=B 0.55
Notes: (a)Details regarding data sources and available sample periods are provided in
the Appendix.
component of logged GDP, as it is common in the literature, but favour instead a
closer comparability with the existing literature on endogenous output penalties.
The central bank deposit rate is calibrated by taking the average dierence of the
ECB rate on the deposit facility and the EONIA-swap rate. This yields a rate on
central bank reserves that lies, on average, 23 basis points below the risk-free rate,
which yields a value for rR of 0:77 percent.
The relationship of collateral quality to the interest rate on interbank markets is
governed by the risk premium 	(qt). We assume a linear relationship and set the
functional form to





where the term in parentheses is the spread of the government bond yield over the
risk-free rate, r^gt  rgt  rf . To calibrate  , we estimate the sensitivity of the interbank
rate rM towards sovereign default risk from the data, using equation (21) and data at
daily frequency over the period 31 March to 7 December 2011. The relatively short
sample period is due to data availability. For the spread on the secured interbank
market rate, we take the general collateral (GC) repo rate of Spain and subtract the
3-month EONIA-swap rate to obtain the interbank premium of Spanish collateral over
the risk-free rate. The government risk premium is taken from the spread of a 10-year
Spanish government benchmark bond over the German Bund. OLS regressions yield
an average marginal eect of  = 0:245.
The remaining parameter values f;K; ;N; p; ; g are found using the simulated
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method of moments (SMM) with the following calibration targets in the stochastic
stationary state. The historical default frequency of Spain is 0.65 percent according
to data from Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer (2007) covering the period 1820 to 2011.25
The capital-to-output ratio from the European Commissions' Ameco database takes
the value of 3.47 over the period of interest ranging from 2000 to 2011. The working
capital need at a quarterly frequency is approximated using data from the Bank of
Spain on the nominal volume of short-term bank loans to the non-nancial sector with
a maturity of up to one year over nominal GDP, which yields a target for =Y of 68
percent. Further, using the bank lending rate on credit to non-nancial corporations
with a maturity below one year, we nd an average credit premium of 50 basis points
at a quarterly frequency over the EONIA-swap rate.
The parameters , p, and  are chosen to target long-run relationships in the
nancial sector. In order to approximate the liquidity preference of banks, we use the
bank liquid reserves to bank asset ratio from the World Bank. According to the data,
it takes an average value of 1.53 percent over the period 2000 to 2011 and we target
the long run average of the ratio Re=( +M + qBD) from the model to match this
statistic.
A central value in our calibration is the ratio of wholesale funding to aggregate bank
liabilities in the stochastic steady state (M=Lbanks), where we derive aggregate bank
liabilities in the model from bank balance sheets as Lbanks = N +M + qBD.26 The
ratio M=Lbanks has implications for the size of the default penalty through the freeze
on the interbank market. In the baseline calibration, we approximate the aggregate
use of wholesale funding in the Spanish banking sector by taking the ratio of deposits
by domestic credit institutions over total domestic liabilities available from the Bank
of Spain at a monthly frequency. Taking the long-run average of this ratio, we set
the calibration target to M=Lbanks = 0:20. We consider this to be a conservative
assumption on the dependence of Spanish banks on wholesale funding given that we
do abstract from cross-border ows within the euro area.27 Finally, regarding the ratio
of domestic to total government debt we set the target to roughly 55 percent using
the sovereign investor base estimates by Arslanalp & Tsuda (2012) starting in the rst
quarter of 2004.
From the SMM, we obtain a relatively low value for the household discount factor,
 = 0:92, which is common in the literature on endogenous sovereign default.28 The
value obtained for the working capital requirement  = 1:074 is not directly compa-
rable to the literature on emerging market business cycles29 or to Mendoza & Yue
(2012), since working capital in our model is nanced by domestic banks while the
literature on emerging market business cycles refers to a borrowing requirement on
25Spain defaulted four times in the 19th century and exhibits a historical default frequency that is
very close to that of Argentina.
26From an accounting perspective, government bonds constitutes bank equity according to the
balance sheet equation Rp +  + qBD;p = Np +M +Kb;p, where type p bank equity Kb;p  qBD;p
is the residual to equate the asset with the liability side.
27For a comparison, Giannone et al. (2012) estimate that wholesale funding makes up to 60 percent
of banking sector liabilities in the euro area.
28E.g. Mendoza & Yue (2012) use  = 0:88.
29Neumeyer & Perri (2005) and Uribe & Yue (2006) use values in the range of 1 to 1.2 in order to
generate an eect of a stochastic interest rate on output.
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international capital markets. This modelling dierence by itself justies a higher pa-
rameter value for , in particular given that external nance in Europe is traditionally
bank-dominated.30 For the remaining parameters, we nd K = 11:92, N = 2:97,
p = 0:568,  = 0:257, and  = 7:52.
In order to nd a numerical solution to the equilibrium described in Section 3.9, we
follow the literature on quantitative models of sovereign default using value function
iteration on the government problem on a discrete state space. The exogenous pro-
ductivity state variable is dened on a grid with 15 nodes. We use Tauchen's (1986)
procedure to discretise the state space of total factor productivity according to its law
of motion from equation (6). The endogenous state variables are discretised over a
grid with equidistant nodes, and intervals B 2 [Bmin; 0] and BD 2 [0; BDmax], where
BDmax =  Bmin. We make sure that the boundary of total government debt is non-
binding along the simulated equilibrium path. Detailed explanations regarding the
computational strategy are laid out in Appendix D.
4.2 Sovereign risk and nancial frictions
The nancial frictions in the model propagate endogenous sovereign default risk to
nancial market conditions, which in turn determine real sector allocations. In this
section, we spell out the contributions of the main assumptions regarding these ex
ante costs of sovereign risk in a numerical example before proceeding to the quantita-
tive evaluation of the dynamic properties of the set-up. Specically, we show partial
equilibria as laid out in Section 3.6 for dierent calibrations of reduced form nancial
frictions.
Figure 4: Interaction of default risk and nancial frictions
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Note: Productivity xed at eAt = 1, and a non-binding collateral constraint. Interest
rates in Panel (a) in percentage points at annual frequency.
Figure 4 illustrates the interaction of nancial frictions and sovereign risk in the
repayment equilibrium. Default risk is shown in terms of a decreasing bond price
30Using the approximation of working capital needs following Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2007), i.e.
two thirds of the Spanish contribution to euro area M1 over Spanish GDP, yields a similarly high
parameter value for , which is in line with higher observed working capital needs in the euro area
compared to the U.S. (Christiano et al. 2010).
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according to investors' pricing equation (27). The parameter  > 0 governs the cost
of wholesale bank funding according to the risk premium on secured interbank debt
	(qt). The lower the value of  , the lower is the elasticity of the interbank rate on
sovereign risk (Fig. 4a). The increase in the interbank rate propagates into lower
interbank loan volumes through the interaction with the need for liquid reserves on
interbank loans (Fig. 4b).
How does the precautionary motive for liquidity accumulation inuence the decline
in intermediated funds? This friction introduces a spread over the interbank rate
rMt in its relationship to the credit rate r

t . The optimality condition on interbank
loans from equation (19) illustrates this point. Assume that the collateral constraint







An exogenous increase in sovereign risk results in a rise in rMt according to the risk
premium 	(qt), which in turn leads to an even stronger increase in the credit rate in
order for the relationship to hold.31 The intuition follows from the opportunity cost
of liquidity buers that increase with higher funding costs on the interbank market.
Figure 4(c) shows variations in the parameter  from its baseline value. With an
increase in , the interbank loans react less sensitive to an increase in default risk, as
the need to build liquidity buers for precautionary motives is reduced. This renders
interbank borrowing more attractive, since a higher fraction of interbank loans can be
channelled to protable credit.












































Note: Allocations in unconstrained and constrained (dotted lines) equi-
librium. Credit rate in levels at annual frequency (rhs).
Next, we investigate the eects of an occasionally binding collateral constraint on
31This follows from 1=[1   (1=)] > 1. Further, note that  > 1 is a necessary condition for an
equilibrium on the interbank market.
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the equilibrium allocations. In Figure 5, the allocations with a non-binding constraint
are compared to those under a binding constraint, both under the baseline calibration.
Interbank loans, credit, labour and output are shown in percentages compared to the
case of a least restricted economy, that is, given a non-binding collateral constraint and
absent the risk of sovereign default. The amount of collateral is exogenously chosen in
this example to induce a drop in interbank loan volume of 10 percent absent sovereign
risk.
While the decline in interbank intermediation with rising sovereign risk is known
from the previous explanations, the shortage of collateral assets imposes, on top of
that, a borrowing constraint on the interbank market. In the constrained equilibrium,
the amount of credit available to the non-nancial sector is thus limited from the
supply side. Through the working capital requirement, this has an immediate impact
on labour input, which needs to be nanced with credit from banks. With cash
demand of non-nancial rms remaining unmet, rms need to cut back on labour
input for production. At some degree of default risk, the eect on interbank loans
from nancial frictions is stronger than the original scarcity of collateral assets, such
that the collateral requirement is not binding any longer.
4.3 Default, credit crunch, and domestic debt
In this section, we characterise the optimal default decision in general equilibrium. We
show that the default decision is aected by the size of the disciplining penalty and
by domestic holdings of debt. Collateral purchases depend on the productivity state
and propagate aggregate shocks over time.
The penalty from defaulting on sovereign debt results from a breakdown of interbank
intermediation when the market value of government bonds collapses to zero. Thus,
nancial resources can no longer be channelled to their most eective use and type p
banks are limited in their funds to the existing stock of liquid assets when extending
credit to non-nancial rms. The associated output cost of sovereign default is a
consequence of the resulting credit crunch in the default period that shrinks the feasible
set of allocations for the production sector of the model economy. The working capital
assumption imposes an upper bound to the amount of labour which can be employed
in the economy under autarky. From equation (4) we get the equilibrium condition
Lt = t=(Wt). Hence, as t drops from the supply side, output falls as wage bills
cannot be nanced. However, the output cost of a sovereign default induced credit
crunch are not independent of the stance of the business cycle.
Figure 6a shows the dierence between allocations in the repayment equilibrium in
comparison to the default equilibrium as a function of total factor productivity. For the
repayment equilibrium, we assume that there is no default risk. In the unconstrained
repayment equilibrium, a credit crunch associated with a sovereign default is more
than six times higher in a high productivity state compared to a low productivity
state. The reason is that credit demand is larger during a boom, leading to more
interbank trading. With elevated labour productivity, non-nancial rms are willing
to pay higher wages which actuates labour supply. Hence, credit demand varies quite
strongly over the cycle. The interbank freeze induced by a sovereign default shrinks
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Figure 6: Cost of default and domestic debt accumulation
(a) Cost of sovereign default over the cycle

























(b) Secondary bond market pricing






















Note: Panel (a). Percentage reductions in the default regime compared to the repay-
ment regime absent sovereign default risk. Dotted lines illustrate the scenario with a
binding collateral constraint in the repayment equilibrium. Panel (b) - AN denotes a
neutral productivity realisation exp(At) = 1, and AL < AN < AH .
available credit by up to 60 percent. This supply-side reduction of credit causes output
to drop by more than 20 percent of GDP in high productivity states. At the same
time, low demand for credit make a credit crunch less painful in terms of output losses
during deep recessions, when the costs of default in terms of output losses are below
10 percent.
The occasionally binding collateral constraint introduces asymmetry in the form
of downward skewness into the business cycle, as can be seen from the constrained
allocations in Figure 6a. Since collateral holding is an endogenous state variable that is
determined on the basis of expected future productivity realisations, unexpected large
productivity realisations might not necessarily lead to a boom, as credit and output
remain constrained through the interbank market. Domestically held government
debt is, thus, not only shaping default incentives in the dynamic model, but also an
important determinant of business cycle uctuations.
Furthermore, the credit crunch is relatively less costly in the constrained regime
when nancial intermediation is limited by domestic holding of government debt. As
a consequence, default incentives are directly aected by nancial market allocations.
This illustrates that causality is running in both direction in the model, from sovereign
risk to the banking sector, but also from a dysfunctional interbank market to default
risk. It is worth noting that this reverse causality is not the result of an explicit or
implicit banking sector bailout guarantee from the public sector.32
Figure 6b presents the pricing of collateral assets by banks in comparison to the
pricing of government debt by international investors on the bond market. Pricing
32Acharya et al. (2014) model the link between public bailout policies and sovereign credit risk.
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vectors ~q are the optimal policy functions extracted from the solved model for dier-
ent states of productivity, At. Specically, we take the price vectors at three levels
of productivity. To begin with, we take a neutral productivity state ~q(AN), with
exp(AN) = 1. In line with the stylized representation of the secondary bond market
in Figure 3, demand for government bonds from domestic banks is downward sloping,
since the liquidity premium on government debt is falling with increasing collateral
positions. The equilibrium quantity of bank purchases of government debt are deter-
mined where the no-arbitrage condition ~q = q is satised. Next, we are interested
to see how current productivity realisations change incentives for domestic debt ac-
cumulation. Considering a higher (lower) productivity state today shifts demand for
collateral upward (downward). This is in line with expected credit demand in the
following period which is based on expected productivity, Et(At+1) = At. Given
higher expected protability of intermediation, banks have an incentive to accumulate
domestic debt in a pro-cyclical manner, as the liquidity premium ^t from Proposition
2 is also pro-cyclical. In general equilibrium, this has implications for the cyclicality of
sovereign risk premiums, as from Proposition 6 domestically held debt is by itself low-
ering the incentive to opt for debt repudiation, contributing to overall pro-cyclicality
of the nancial sector.
Figure 7: Decision to default in the state space
(a) Along the TFP dimension (b) Along the dimension of domestic debt
Note: Dark shaded region represents states of optimal default, while the area in light
grey represents repayment. Government assets in percent over steady state output. In
Panel (a), debt held by domestic banks is held constant at a suciently high level such
that the collateral constraint is non-binding. In Panel (b), total factor productivity
is constant at its mean value.
The model exposes two channels that contribute to the counter-cyclical behaviour of
the government bond risk premium, namely the pro-cyclical output cost of sovereign
default and domestic debt accumulation in the decentralised equilibrium. Figure 7
shows the combined eect of the two channels on the enforceability of total government
debt. Technically, this shows the value functions under default V d and repayment
V nd. The light grey shaded area represents the region where the value of repayment
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Figure 8: Bond prices and default set

































Note: Panel (a). The bond price schedule qt is conditional on current state s 2
(Bt; B
D
t ; At) and represents the set of nancial contracts available between foreign
investors and the government, for dierent period t choices t 2 (Bt+1; BDt+1). Asset
positions are in percent of steady state output. Panel (b). Plotted is the frontier of
the default set  (B;BD), or min(At) 2 s : V dt (Bt; BDt ; At) > V ndt (Bt; BDt ; At).
dominates the value of default in the government problem, whereas in the dark shaded
area the government decides to default.
In a framework with non-Ricardian output eects of government debt, we nd that
transitory productivity shocks have a strong eect on the borrowing limit that is more
than ve times as large in high productivity states compared to very low productivity
states (Figure 7a). This result is contrary to the ndings of Aguiar & Gopinath
(2006) who show that transitory productivity shocks in an endowment economy cannot
generate a signicant steepness of the indierence line which separates the default
region from the repayment region. The sensitivity of the debt ceiling to aggregate
shocks translates into a quantitatively important region of risky borrowing, which is
dened over the interval of government indebtedness where foreign investors charge a
risk premium over the risk-free rate (Figure 8a).
Further, it is the net foreign asset position that determines default incentives in the
presented setting (Figure 7b). The reason is that domestic government debt does not
directly aect the aggregate resource constraint of the economy, as it is consolidated
over dividend payments with the budget constraint of the representative household.33
By contrast, benets from defaulting are due to foreign owned government debt as
debt repayment leads to wealth transfers abroad. In the extreme, government debt is
always enforced if total outstanding debt is held domestically.34
This nding is in line with qualitative models on sovereign default with external and
domestic debt. Guembel & Sussman (2009) develop a political economy model where
33Notwithstanding, domestic debt does aect the resource constraint indirectly through aggregate
production.
34The 45-degree line in Figure 7b indicates the set of states where  Bt = BDt . Our result rests on
the assumption that taxation is non distortionary.
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the household sector is heterogeneous in its holdings of government assets. They show
that an electoral system with majority voting leads to a conict of interest which is
able to enforce foreign-owned sovereign debt even if penalties are absent. For this
mechanism to work, the inability to discriminate among bond holders is a crucial as-
sumption. Similarly, Broner et al. (2010) show that the possibility of secondary market
trading alone gives rise to full enforcement of sovereign debt contracts if domestic bond
holders are unable to collude.
We introduce secondary bond market trading under the assumptions that (i) the
government cannot discriminate and that (ii) the aggregate amount of domestically
held debt is public information. This allows banks to form expectations on default
probabilities in period t + 1 by taking account of their own decision to accumulate
domestic debt. Domestic debt thereby constitutes a coordination device for the gov-
ernment, domestic and foreign investors alike. However, this device itself is closely
linked to the business cycle, making it weaker during recessions when domestic banks
have lower incentives to hold government debt. Dierently said, although there exists
a repayment equilibrium for very high levels of government debt, the economy cannot
coordinate to this point along the equilibrium path as banks do not have the incentive
to accumulate a high enough share of outstanding government debt.35
Finally, there is propagation of the productivity shock over time. Since the pro-
ductivity process is persistent, the domestic banking sector will raise its demand for
collateral as it expects an increased demand for credit and intermediation in case of an
above average productivity realisation. An improved net foreign asset position reduces
the interest rate on government debt (Proposition 3). This has a positive feedback
eect over time, since a higher share of domestic debt lowers default incentives in the
consecutive period (Proposition 6). At lower levels of sovereign risk, aggregate output
is higher since the cost of nance to non-nancial rms is not inated by nancial
frictions. Thus, the repayment equilibrium turns out to be self-enforcing.
However, the same mechanism induces a downward spiral in response to adverse
shocks. After a series of bad shocks to productivity, domestic banks reduce their
investment in collateral and pay out dividends to households. Credit demand drops,
which lowers the penalty from a credit crunch. Under these conditions, the burden
from repaying international investors is high, rendering default an attractive option
from the planner's perspective in bad states of the world.36 Figure 8b visualises the
set of states s 2 At; Bt; BDt 	 for which default from an ex post perspective turns out
to be the optimal policy of the benevolent government.
35Thereby, the model does not support the crowding out hypothesis in the course of the European
sovereign debt crisis as formulated in Broner et al. (2014). This is due to the fact that secondary
market trading does not include arbitrage trading as in Broner et al. (2010). Besides, government
debt and credit do not enter the same ow of funds constraint in this model as they have dierent
maturities.
36While the theoretical literature stresses the possibility of partial insurance against very bad shocks




5.1 Stochastic stationary state and cyclical behaviour
We simulate the model in order to extract the stochastic stationary state and cyclical
co-movement generated by the bank-sovereign link in our framework. To this end, we
simulate the stochastic process for aggregate productivity 3000 times for 864 periods in
each simulation round. We feed the generated series into the model and delete the rst
100 elements such that we are left with 191 years of observations, which captures the
1820-2011 time span used to calibrate the default frequency. Data from 48 periods prior
to a sovereign default generated by the model is extracted to calculate the moment
statistics that cover the 2000q1 to 2011q4 era. The underlying assumption is that Spain
most likely would have lost capital market access and defaulted as a consequence in
the course of 2012 if non-standard measures taken by the ECB to calm secondary
markets would not have been taken.37 We evaluate the model given moments from
available Spanish data, as described in the baseline calibration. Additionally, data for
output and consumption is taken from the OECD's Quarterly National Accounts. We
use the GDP deator in order to transform nominal loan volumes into real volumes
and we extract the cyclical component of logged variables using the hp-lter with the
standard smoothing parameter for quarterly data.
Table 3 column (2) summarises the results under the baseline calibration. The model
is able to generate a comparatively high debt-to-GDP ratio with an average of 21.4
percent. Although this is still below the debt level observed in the data, models with
ad hoc default penalties on output endowment realisations have typically diculties
to generate such high public debt levels. The asymmetric default penalty from the
interbank freeze contributes to our result, similar to the ndings of Mendoza & Yue
(2012). The planner faces two separate incentives to borrow when deciding on the
optimal debt policy. First, there is the marginal benet of borrowing from capital
markets based on the consumption smoothing preferences in the light of risk-averse
and impatient households, which is common to existing models of sovereign default.
A novel borrowing incentive arises due to the liquidity services that are required to
facilitate the creation of credit, which is used for production in the economy. Thereby
arises simultaneously the incentive to borrow large amounts from capital markets in
order to accommodate underlying nancial frictions, while at the same time being
disciplined by the endogenous penalty mechanism to adjust the debt level over the
business cycle such that default is prevented. As a result, the amount of outstanding
government debt is more sensitive to transitory productivity shocks and high debt
levels are sustained in the stochastic stationary state. While high debt-to-GDP ratios
can also be generated at low default frequencies (Aguiar & Gopinath 2006), our model
yields a realistic default frequency of 0.63 percent.
We nd a close link between the average default frequency and the sovereign risk
premium, which is a common nding in the literature given the direct link of the default
37This does not seem to be a very unrealistic assumption given that Spain and Italy suered
further increases in government bond yields in the rst half of 2012. It was the ECB's announcement
of unlimited interventions in secondary sovereign bond markets under the OMT programme in August
2012 that prevented a further escalation of the debt crisis in the euro area.
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Table 3: Baseline results and robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Data Baseline Robustness
 = 0  = 103  = 0;
 = 103
Stochastic stationary state
Debt-to-GDP ratio 39.1 21.4 21.6 20.1 20.1
Dom. debt share 54.9 61.7 61.9 59.1 59.0
Sovereign premium 0.122 0.754 0.734 0.747 0.738
Credit premium 0.504 0.158 0.073 0.061 -0.120
Repo premium 0.194 -0.045 -0.230 -0.047 -0.230
Frequency of default 0.65 0.63 0.624 0.626 0.626
Output drop at default - 19.6 19.9 19.8 20.0
Relative volatility
Std.consumption/Std.output 1.10 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06
Correlations
(A.) with output
Lending 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Sovereign premium -0.14 -0.44 -0.42 -0.43 -0.41
Credit premium -0.32 -0.03 0.27 -0.03 0.26
Repo premium - -0.44 0.0 -0.43 0.0
(B.) with sovereign premium
Credit premium 0.84 0.40 -0.17 0.44 -0.16
Lending -0.26 -0.46 -0.41 -0.44 -0.40
Notes: Details regarding the data are available in Appendix E.
probability with the bond pricing equation of international investors. In this context,
the no-arbitrage condition of international investors from Proposition 3 prevents that
the liquidity premium on bond prices from Proposition 2 translates overall into a lower
risk premium on government debt.38 The sovereign risk premium generated under the
baseline calibration takes a value of 0.754 percent on average, which is substantially
higher than the observable average risk premium on Spanish government bonds over
German Bund. As shown by Bernoth & Erdogan (2012), the yield on Spanish debt
over the period 2000-11 is aected by the convergence period after entering EMU when
investors charged a historically low risk premium and is not necessarily a representative
sample period.
The credit premium and the interbank premium as targeted in the SMM procedure
are both functions of the parameters governing the spillover of sovereign risk to nan-
cial frictions. Note that the interbank market premium rM   rf is below zero in the
stochastic stationary state of the model since the opportunity investment for unpro-
ductive banks is rR < rf .39 With low default risk in the majority of states along the
equilibrium path, we obtain rM < rf .40 Further, an average spread is also maintained
38Models that generate a higher risk premium compared to the default frequency use modications
of the utility function of the international investor, see Lizarazo (2013) and Pouzo & Presno (2013).
39Variables with a bar denote steady state values.
40This is in line with the data, as the secured interbank rate EUREPO usually trades below the
unsecured interbank rates EURIBOR and EONIA swap. Only the short time period of elevated
sovereign risk available for the Spanish GC repo rate indicates a slightly positive spread.
31
between the secured interbank rate rM and the credit rate r which is in our model
due to the liquidity preference.
The data shows parallels in Spanish business cycle moments with stylised facts from
emerging markets. Namely, the volatility in consumption exceeds that of output, and
the sovereign risk premium is negatively correlated with the cycle. The model is able
to reproduce both moments, although it overestimates the negative correlation of out-
put with the sovereign risk premium. The counter-cyclical sovereign risk premium is a
result of the endogenous default penalty which makes default more attractive during
recessions, while there are virtually no defaults during boom periods. As a conse-
quence, the counter-cyclical risk premium renders public borrowing less attractive
during recessions, while simultaneously leading to a consumption boom during ex-
pansions given loose credit conditions on international capital markets and impatient
households. On top of that, the planner is trading-o the expected future distortions
on domestic nancial markets when taking his optimal borrowing decision. In models
with exogenous endowment processes, the trade-o on borrowing higher amounts takes
only the interest rate eect into consideration.
In Mendoza & Yue (2012), increases in the cost of borrowing for the public sector
translate, by assumption, into a higher cost of credit for the private sector, which
induces an inecient substitution into domestic goods in the production of interme-
diate goods that weighs on output.41 In our framework, the propagation of higher
sovereign risk into rising cost of private credit is explicitly modelled. The credit rate
rt depends primarily on aggregate productivity and the funding situation of domestic
banks. As the funding conditions are tied to sovereign risk during times of scal stress,
the collateral channel of sovereign risk is able to account for a positive correlation on
public and private sector risk premiums. The model underestimates the correlation
coecient with 0.40 while the data exhibits a stronger correlation of 0.84.
The same mechanism leads to an overall mildly counter-cyclical credit premium of
-0.03. There are two o-setting eects in the model that shape the correlation of the
credit premium with output. While the credit premium is demand-determined and
pro-cyclical in normal times absent scal stress, it turns counter-cyclical in the model
during crisis periods, as it is discussed in the next section.
The data shows a high correlation of lending to non-nancial rms with output.
This pro-cyclicality of credit is overestimated by the model, as working capital lending
is perfectly correlated with output. With a xed capital stock, output has only two
sources of uctuations, labour input and productivity, which are both highly corre-
lated, too. As labour input requires working capital lending, credit is directly linked
to production. With endogenous capital accumulation, this link may well be weaker.
Finally, Spanish data shows that the sovereign risk spread of government bonds over
German Bunds is negatively correlated with short-term lending to non-nancial rms.
The model closely matches this negative correlation in the data and rationalises the
result by providing a theory of endogenous sovereign risk and the supply of credit in
general equilibrium.
41The authors rationalise this result by showing that a government diverts the outstanding private
loans on international capital markets in the event of a default. This leads to coinciding risk of default
in the public and the private sector.
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We conduct a range of robustness checks in order to validate our ndings. In column
(3), we eliminate the risk premium on secured interbank debt. This implies a repo pre-
mium of -23 basis points from the calibration since rMt = r
R, independent of sovereign
risk. Since the bank funding conditions do not react to the level of default risk any
longer, the credit premium turns strongly pro-cyclical as the demand eect dominates
credit conditions over the business cycle. Also, the co-movement of interest rates can
no longer be replicated by the model. This underlines that supply side eects of bank
credit are important for the explanation of cross-correlations and long-run averages
of dierent interest rates in the model. However, since the ex post penalty from de-
faulting remains in place, the stochastic steady state levels of government debt are not
aected. The marginal increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio follows from the fact that
there are less adverse consequences of sovereign risk, which allows the government to
marginally increase its level of indebtedness.
In column (4), we eliminate the liquidity preference and set  = 103. As a direct
consequence, the credit premium in the steady state drops as the opportunity cost
vanishes from accumulating liquid reserves when productive banks borrow from the
interbank market since Ret ! 0. However, the remaining results stay qualitatively and
quantitatively the same as under the baseline calibration.
Finally, we eliminate both frictions simultaneously in column (5). The results are
similar as in column (3), suggesting that the risk premium is more important for the
quantitative results than the liquidity preference.
5.2 Debt crisis, collateral squeeze, and macroeconomic dy-
namics
Against the background of the stylised facts from the euro area sovereign debt crisis,
we are interested in the qualitative and quantitative predictions of the model around
default events. We present the average behaviour of time series produced by our
model simulations in a default window including 4 years prior and after a default
event (Figure 9).
The eect of the sovereign risk channel unfolding in the run-up to a sovereign debt
crisis event are presented in Figure 9a. The risk premium on sovereign debt rises
steadily from its long-term mean before a default takes place. In the pre-crisis period,
lower than average productivity realisations dampen the demand for credit, which
translates into a slightly lower credit premium on private debt. The initial decline
in the credit rate is demand-driven, reecting the below average labour productivity,
which has to compensate for the cost of credit according to the optimal labour demand
condition (5). With rising sovereign risk and a further deterioration in the quality
of collateral, funding costs of banks start to increase. In response, lending banks
charge higher credit rates on working capital loans to non-nancial rms even though
demand is falling. Additionally, the rise in the cost of interbank loans interacts with
the preference for liquidity, that requires lending banks to build excess reserves on each
unit of borrowed funds on the interbank market. This preserves a spread between the
interbank rate and the credit rate, bearing an additional rise in the credit rate. As a
result, the interest rates on public and private sector debt are highly correlated shortly
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Figure 9: Macrodynamics around default events
(a) Sovereign risk channel



















































before a default takes place.
In comparison to the Argentinian default of 2001, the macroeconomic dynamics
around default events as characterised by the bank-sovereign link are dierent in that
our model predicts (i) a more severe recession related to a sovereign debt crisis; (ii)
the impact eect of default on output to be much stronger; and (iii) that recessions
last longer (Figure 9b).
Quantitative models of sovereign default typically predict a recession prior to default
as debt repayment gets more painful during these times (Arellano 2008).42 However,
the interaction of sovereign risk with nancial frictions in the presence of the collat-
eral channel of sovereign risk forms an amplication mechanism that leads to output
losses beyond the fall in aggregate productivity prior to a sovereign default. The deep
recessions observed in the euro area in the aftermath of the global nancial crisis that
preceded the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis complement this view.
In the period of government default, a freeze on the interbank market leads to an im-
minent credit crunch and a deep recession. Under the baseline calibration, the model
predicts a drop in credit of about 27 percent in response to a complete breakdown
of interbank intermediation. As a consequence of the credit crunch and rising cost of
capital, output drops by about 19 percent compared to the long-run mean on impact.
Although this is a dramatic decline in output, it is not unprecedented in economic his-
tory. Reinhart & Rogo (2009) document that nancial crises lead to output losses of
9.3 percent on average, but have also signicantly exceeded this number.43 Otherwise,
given that the model does not account for nancial assistance programmes from EMU
member countries, the output losses generated by the model probably poses an upper
42This result is in line with empirical ndings by Levy-Yeyati & Panizza (2011) who analyse a
cross-section of historical default events.
43In particular, the US cumulative decline in per capita GDP in response to the Great Depression
of 1929 from peak to trough was 29 percent.
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bound in the Spanish case.44
In the post-crisis period, output recovers slowly. Persistence of production is due
to the highly auto-correlated exogenous process of productivity and an endogenous
propagation mechanism, as collateral needs to be accumulated by banks out of retained
earnings over time. This prevents a fast recovery in lending conditions. Remember
from the bank balance sheet identity that collateral assets represent bank capital from
an accounting perspective. After a complete write-o of government debt, there is no
bank capital left. This poses an extremely large shock on bank balance sheets, which
have a dicult time recovering during the low productivity environment following a
default. Therefore, the model is supporting the view of long-lasting nancial recessions
(Cerra & Saxena 2008) as opposed to a strong recovery observed in the follow-up to
emerging market crises (Calvo et al. 2006).
5.3 Sensitivity analysis and discussion
In this section we provide further sensitivity analyses in order to underpin the ro-
bustness of the quantitative results. Besides, a more detailed discussion of the model
propagation mechanism helps to understand the complex interactions of dierent de-
fault incentives at play in the model.
Table 4 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis. Lowering the parameter
p to 0:45 increases the need for reallocation of funds across banks on the interbank
market, as fewer banks are matched with non-nancial rms. With an increasingly
important interbank market, a default-related credit crunch gets more destructive, as
there are fewer nancial resources available to lending banks in the autarky state. As
a consequence, the debt-to-GDP ratio more than doubles and exceeds, at 48.5 percent,
the observable level in the data, while default occurs less often.
The parameter p can be interpreted as a short cut for nancial development or
nancial institutions which allow a banking system to generate more intermediation.
The here presented model with a collateral channel of sovereign risk conrms the
ndings of Gennaioli et al. (2014) in that an economy with more developed nancial
institutions is more vulnerable to sovereign defaults.
A reduction in the available nancial resources N increases the penalty of default
as fewer nancial resources are left for credit in the autarky period. The average
sustainable level of government indebtedness increases to 26.2 percent. This is the
case even though a lower share of total outstanding debt is held domestically, given
that fewer nancial resources are intermediated on the interbank market. At the same
time, a lower value for N pushes up the interest rate on credit as nancial resources
are more scarce in equilibrium and the spread r  rM almost doubles compared to the
baseline calibration. When sovereign risk rises due to low productivity realisations,
the demand-eect in the premium on credit is now stronger, leading to a less strong
correlation of private and public sector interest rates.
Turning to the working capital assumption, we reduce the fraction that needs to be
nanced up-front to  = 0:95. Note that this change leaves all other parameters from
44See Fink & Scholl (2011) and Juessen & Schabert (2013) for models of sovereign default with a
bailout mechanism.
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Table 4: Sensitivity analysis
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Debt/GDP Domestic default r   rM (r^gt ; Yt) (r^t ; r^gt ) Output
debt share frequ. drop
Data 49.5 49.0 0.654 0.459 -0.08 0.84 -
Baseline 21.4 61.7 0.628 0.210 -0.44 0.40 19.6
p = 0:70 7.0 86.7 0.397 0.320 0.21 0.43 8.3
p = 0:45 48.5 47.1 0.151 0.250 -0.30 0.28 28.4
N = 3:15 16.5 72.0 0.656 0.140 -0.15 0.48 16.2
N = 2:80 26.2 55.3 0.437 0.350 -0.51 0.33 22.3
 = 1:25 35.0 48.9 0.151 0.122 -0.30 0.13 24.8
 = 0:95 12.1 78.7 0.684 0.180 0.02 0.51 13.5
! = 1:6 16.2 73.5 0.616 0.140 -0.05 0.55 15.0
! = 1:3 27.1 54.0 0.313 0.580 -0.39 0.24 24.5
 = 0:40 21.5 61.6 0.613 0.220 -0.45 0.55 19.7
 = 0:10 21.6 61.8 0.630 0.180 -0.43 0.22 19.9
 = 15 19.5 63.0 0.529 0.150 -0.26 0.42 18.8
 = 3 24.1 65.5 0.619 0.740 -0.46 0.24 19.5
 = 0:25 16.0 82.6 0.491 0.180 -0.14 0.49 18.5
 = 0:35 25.7 67.7 0.626 0.270 -0.43 0.24 19.7
 = 0:15 16.6 50.8 0.622 0.160 -0.42 0.56 19.6
Notes: A hat denotes the spread of the corresponding interest rate over the risk-free rate rf .
the baseline calibration unaected. Under these conditions, lowering  has a similar
eect as increasing N , as more nancial resources are available in the system in relation
to a fall in credit demand. The default penalty from an output drop decreases, making
default more likely on average. This, in turn, lowers the ratio of debt-to-GDP in the
model.
The parameter ! governs the Frisch elasticity of labour supply according to 1=(1 !).
Thereby, increasing ! translates into lower substitution eects of labour supply in
response to changes in the equilibrium wage rate. Remember that the bank-sovereign
link unfolds in conjunction with the working capital constraint on labour input, as
sovereign risk drives up the price of labour from the perspective of the non-nancial
rm. Consequently, setting ! to 1.6, we nd that the output cost of default drops,
leading to lower levels of debt. As labour supply is less sensitive to a fall in the wage
rate given higher values for !, the distortions arising from the sovereign risk channel
can be compensated by lower equilibrium wages.
Lifting the parameter  from the baseline calibration of 0.245 to 0.4 intensies
the spillovers from sovereign risk to the cost of funding on domestic interbank markets
when the quality of collateral deteriorates. This drives the correlation of risk premiums
on public and private sector debt to 0.55 and lightly enforces the counter-cyclical
correlation with output.
Increasing  reduces the need for excess reserves when borrowing funds on the
interbank market. Less severe frictions in the model lead to marginally more nancial
resources available for working capital credit, as there are fewer productive reserves
required to self-insure against roll-over risk. This lowers the negative correlation of
the sovereign risk premium with output to -0.26.
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The parameter governing the stochastic probability of re-entering capital markets
 might be lower in the Spanish case than in the baseline calibration tted to a
cross-section of emerging market economies, as international investors might put more
condence into the institutional setting in the euro area.45 To check for the eects
of a faster re-access to capital markets, we set the re-entry probability to  = 0:25,
which represents an average exclusion spell of one year. As this constitutes a direct
reduction of costs of default, the debt-to-GDP level shrinks in the long-run average.
With fewer government securities available in the economy, the share of domestic debt
rises.
At very low levels of , domestic banks draw higher liquidity services per unit of
government bonds. At the same time, the demand for liquidity services is limited in the
model given a downward sloping demand curve for credit and interbank loans. In sum,
the domestic share of total government debt drops in the stochastic stationary state
compared with the baseline calibration. Non-penalty related repayment incentives on
the side of the government are reduced, which translates into an overall smaller ratio
of sustainable public debt to output. We conclude that non-penalty related incentives
to repay creditors might be an important explanation for high debt-to-GDP ratios
observed in the data of advanced economies.46
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a model of strategic default for advanced, nancially de-
veloped economies that accounts for the bank-sovereign link in a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium setting. The model is calibrated to Spanish data and capable of re-
producing business cycle statistics alongside stylized facts from the European sovereign
debt crisis.
The results show that the adverse feedback loop in peripheral euro area countries
between a dysfunctional interbank market, a weak growth performance, and a rise in
sovereign bond yield spreads can be rationalised by the concept of strategic default. In
the presence of spillovers from sovereign risk to nancial market outcomes, an otherwise
high default penalty loses its disciplinary role and introduces fragility into advanced
countries' public debt positions. The model is able to explain the impairment of credit
conditions along national borders due to the collateral channel of sovereign risk on the
secured interbank market.
Domestically held government debt introduces a motive for government borrowing
by providing liquidity services to the economy, which has not been considered in the
quantitative literature on optimal sovereign default. As a result, the borrowing limit
becomes more responsive to transitory productivity shocks, while at the same time
sustaining higher aggregate levels of debt. Further, we nd that it is the net for-
45For Greece, it took more then two years after the pre-emptive debt restructuring in February
2012 until the rst bond issuance in April 2014.
46Anecdotal evidence points into this direction, as the examples of Italy and Japan indicate, which
both exhibit very high ratios of debt-to-GDP and depend on a domestic investor base. Moreover,
there is evidence in the European sovereign debt crisis that the repatriation of debt is lowering default
risk (Brutti & Saure 2013).
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eign asset position of an economy that determines incentives under strategic default
considerations.
There are limitations to this framework. Specically, the model abstracts from
many relevant questions surrounding the decision to default, as debt renegotiation
(Yue 2010, Bai & Zhang 2012), the maturity structure of debt (Hatchondo & Martinez
2009, Arellano & Ramanarayanan 2012, Chatterjee & Eyigungor 2012), the eects of
international nancial assistance programs (Boz 2011, Fink & Scholl 2011, Juessen
& Schabert 2013), international spillovers (Arellano & Bai 2013), and redistributive
eects of default on domestic debt (D'Erasmo & Mendoza 2012). Further research is
also required to deepen our understanding of the interactions of sovereign risk with
other sources of bank funding. Finally, we leave it for future research to investigate
nancial sector stabilisation policies through the central bank.
References
Acharya, V., Drechsler, I. & Schnabl, P. (2014), `A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts
and Sovereign Credit Risk', The Journal of Finance .
Acharya, V. V. & Rajan, R. G. (2013), `Sovereign debt, government myopia, and the
nancial sector', Review of Financial Studies 26(6), 1526{1560.
Aguiar, M. & Gopinath, G. (2006), `Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current
account', Journal of International Economics 69, 64{83.
Arellano, C. (2008), `Default risk and income uctuations in emerging economies',
American Economic Review 98(3), 690{712.
Arellano, C. & Bai, Y. (2013), `Linkages across sovereign debt markets', NBER Work-
ing Paper (19548).
Arellano, C. & Ramanarayanan, A. (2012), `Default and the maturity structure in
sovereign bonds', Journal of Political Economy 120(2), 187{232.
Arslanalp, S. & Tsuda, T. (2012), `Tracking global demand for advanced economy
sovereign debt', IMF Working Paper (284).
Bai, Y. & Zhang, J. (2012), `Duration of sovereign debt renegotiation', Journal of
International Economics 86(86), 252{268.
Baltensperger, E. (1980), `Alternative approaches to the theory of the banking rm',
Journal of Monetary Economics 6(1), 1{37.
Barro, R. J. (1976), `The loan market, collateral, and rates of interest', Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 8(4), 439{456.
Beber, A., Brandt, M. W. & Kavajecz, K. A. (2009), `Flight-to-quality or ight-to-
liquidity? Evidence from the euro-area bond market', Review of Financial Studies
22(3), 925{957.
Bernoth, K. & Erdogan, B. (2012), `Sovereign bond yield spreads: A time-varying
coecient approach', Journal of International Money and Finance 31(3), 639{659.
BIS (2011), `The impact of sovereign credit risk on bank funding conditions', CGFS
Papers (43).
Bolton, P. & Jeanne, O. (2011), `Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in nancially
integrated economies', IMF Economic Review (59), 162{194.
Boz, E. (2011), `Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs', Journal of
International Economics 83(1), 70{82.
Broner, F. A., Erce, A., Martin, A. & Ventura, J. (2014), `Secondary markets in turbu-
lent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out eects', Journal of Monetary
Economics 61, 114{142.
39
Broner, F. A., Martin, A. & Ventura, J. (2010), `Sovereign risk and secondary markets',
American Economic Review 100(4), 1523{1555.
Brutti, F. (2011), `Sovereign defaults and liquidity crises', Journal of International
Economics 84(1), 65{72.
Brutti, F. & Saure, P. (2013), `Repatriation of debt in the euro crisis: Evidence for
the secondary market theory', SSRN Working Paper (2253404).
Bulow, J. & Rogo, K. S. (1989), `Sovereign debt: Is to forgive to forget?', American
Economic Review 79(1), 43{50.
Calvo, G. A., Izquierdo, A. & Talvi, E. (2006), `Sudden stops and phoenix miracles in
emerging markets', American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 96(2), 405{
410.
Cerra, V. & Saxena, S. C. (2008), `Growth dynamics: The myth of economic recovery',
American Economic Review 98(1), 439{457.
Chari, V. V., Christiano, L. J. & Eichenbaum, M. (1995), `Inside money, outside
money, and short-term interest rates', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
27(4), 1354{1386.
Chatterjee, S. & Eyigungor, B. (2012), `Maturity, indebtedness, and default risk',
American Economic Review 102(6), 2674{2699.
Christiano, L. J., Motto, R. & Rostagno, M. (2010), `Financial factors in economic
uctuations', ECB Working Paper Series (1192).
Cole, H. L. & Kehoe, P. J. (1998), `Models of sovereign debt: Partial versus general
reputations', International Economic Review 39(1), 50{77.
Cuadra, G., Sanchez, J. & Sapriza, H. (2010), `Fiscal policy and default risk in emerg-
ing markets', Review of Economic Dynamics 13(2), 452{469.
Dang, T. V., Gorton, G. & Holmstrom, B. (2013), `The information sensitivity of a
security'.
Dell'ariccia, G., Detragiache, E. & Rajan, R. G. (2005), `The real eect of banking
crises', IMF Working Paper (63).
D'Erasmo, P. & Mendoza, E. G. (2012), `Domestic sovereign default as optimal redis-
tributive policy', Unpublished Manuscript, University of Pennsylvania .
Diamond, D. W. (1984), `Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring', Review
of Economic Studies 51, 393{414.
Dooley, M. P. (2000), `International nancial architecture and strategic default: Can
nancial crises be less painful?', Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy 53, 361{377.
40
Eaton, J. & Gersovitz, M. (1981), `Debt with potential repudiation: Theoretical and
empirical analysis', Review of Economic Studies 48(2), 289{309.
Ejsing, J. & Lemke, W. (2011), `The Janus-headed salvation: Sovereign and bank
credit risk premia during 2008-2009', Economics Letters 110(1), 28{31.
European Central Bank (2012), `Changes in bank nancing patterns', Frankfurt a. M.
European Central Bank (2013), `Banking structures report', Frankfurt a. M.
Fernandez, A. & Gulan, A. (2012), `Interest rates and business cycles in emerging
economies: The role of nancial frictions', Bank of Finland Research Discussion
Papers (23).
Fink, F. & Scholl, A. (2011), `A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts, and
conditionality', Working Paper Series, University of Konstanz (2011-46).
Gennaioli, N., Martin, A. & Rossi, S. (2014), `Sovereign default, domestic banks, and
nancial institutions', Journal of Finance 69(2), 819{866.
Gertler, M. & Kiyotaki, N. (2011), Financial intermediaries and credit policy in busi-
ness cycle analysis, in B. Friedman & M. Woodford, eds, `Handbook of Monetary
Economics', Elsevier, North-Holland, pp. 547{599.
Giannone, D., Lenza, M., Pill, H. & Reichlin, L. (2012), `The ECB and the interbank
market', ECB Working Paper Series (1496).
Gorton, G. B. & Metrick, A. (2012), `Securitized banking and the run on repo', Journal
of Financial Economics 104(3), 425{451.
Gorton, G. B. & Ordo~nez, G. (2013), `The supply and demand for safe assets', NBER
Working Paper (18732).
Greenwood, J., Hercowitz, Z. & Human, G. W. (1988), `Investment, capital utiliza-
tion, and the real business cycle', American Economic Review 78(3), 402{417.
Grossman, H. I. & van Huyck, J. B. (1988), `Sovereign debt as a contingent
claim: Excusable default, repudiation, and reputation', American Economic Review
78(5), 1088{1097.
Guembel, A. & Sussman, O. (2009), `Sovereign debt without default penalties', Review
of Economic Studies 76, 1297{1320.
Hatchondo, J. C. & Martinez, L. (2009), `Long-duration bonds and sovereign defaults',
Journal of International Economics 79(1), 117{125.
Hatchondo, J. C., Martinez, L. & Sapriza, H. (2010), `Quantitative properties of
sovereign default models: Solution methods matter', Review of Economic Dynamics
13(4), 919{933.
Holmstrom, B. & Tirole, J. (1998), `Private and public supply of liquidity', Journal of
Political Economy 106(1), 1{40.
41
ICMA (2013), `European repo market survey: Number 25 - conducted June 2013:
International Capital Market Association', Zurich.
Juessen, F. & Schabert, A. (2013), `Fiscal policy, sovereign default, and bailouts',
Unpublished Manuscript .
Krishnamurthy, A. & Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2012), `The aggregate demand for trea-
sury debt', Journal of Political Economy 120(2), 233{267.
Kumhof, M. & Tanner, E. (2008), Government debt: A key role in nancial inter-
mediation, in C. M. Reinhart, C. A. Vegh & A. Velasco, eds, `Money, crises, and
transition', MIT Press, Cambridge and Mass., pp. 249{278.
Levy-Yeyati, E. & Panizza, U. (2011), `The elusive costs of sovereign defaults', Journal
of Development Economics 94(1), 95{105.
Lizarazo, S. V. (2013), `Default risk and risk averse international investors', Journal
of International Economics 89, 317{330.
Mendoza, E. G. & Yue, V. Z. (2012), `A general equilibrium model of sovereign default
and business cycles', Quarterly Journal of Economics (127), 889{946.
Neumeyer, P. A. & Perri, F. (2005), `Business cycles in emerging economies: The role
of interest rates', Journal of Monetary Economics 52(2), 345{380.
Niemann, S. & Pichler, P. (2013), `Collateral, liquidity and debt sustainability', Dis-
cussion Paper Series of the University of Essex (730).
Padilla, C. S. (2013), `Sovereign defaults and banking crises', MPRA Working Paper
(41074).
Poole, W. (1968), `Commercial bank reserve management in a stochastic model: Im-
plications for monetary policy', Journal of Finance 23(5), 769{791.
Pouzo, D. & Presno, I. (2013), `Sovereign default risk and uncertainty premia', SSRN
Working Paper .
Reinhart, C. M. & Rogo, K. S. (2009), `The aftermath of nancial crises', American
Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 99(2), 466{472.
Reinhart, C. M. & Rogo, K. S. (2011), `The forgotten history of domestic debt', The
Economic Journal (121), 319{350.
Richmond, C. & Dias, D. A. (2009), `Duration of capital market exclusion: An empri-
cial investigation', SSRN Working Paper .
Sandleris, G. (2014), `Sovereign defaults, credit to the private sector, and domestic
credit market institutions', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 46(2-3), 321{
345.
Schmitt-Grohe, S. & Uribe, M. (2007), `Optimal, simple, and implementable monetary
and scal rules', Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 702{1725.
42
Smets, F. & Wouters, R. (2002), `An estimated stochastic dynamic general equilibium
model of the Euro area', ECB Working Paper Series (171).
Sturzenegger, F. & Zettelmeyer, J. (2007), Debt, defaults and lessons from a decade
of crises, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
Tauchen, G. (1986), `Finite state Markov-chain approximations to univariate and vec-
tor autoregressions', Economics Letters 20, 177{181.
Tomz, M. & Wright, M. L. J. (2007), `Do countries default in bad times?', Journal of
the European Economic Association 5(2-3), 352{360.
Uribe, M. & Yue, V. Z. (2006), `Country spreads and emerging countries: Who drives
whom?', Journal of International Economics 69, 6{36.
Woodford, M. (1990), `Public debt as private liquidity', American Economic Review:
Papers & Proceedings 80(2), 382{388.
Yue, V. Z. (2010), `Sovereign default and debt renegotiation', Journal of International
Economics 80(2), 176{187.
Zame, W. R. (1993), `Eciency and the role of default when security markets are
incomplete', American Economic Review 83(5), 1142{1164.
43
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. In order that a representative bank for each type exists, the
proof has to show (i) that aggregated collateral holding is identical to the probability
mass  ; and (ii) that the distribution of collateral within each type  does not aect
individual decisions.
Step (i) By assumption it holds that each bank retains an identical amount of liquid
nancial resources from dividend payments and collateral purchases, i.e. for i 6= j it
holds that N i = N

j for all  2 fp; ug. It follows that
R 
0
N i di = 
N . Returns on
investment opportunities are equal across idiosyncratic banks, hence each bank takes
identical choices over credit and interbank allocations given identical holdings of col-
lateral assets and endowment of liquid assets N j . Although D
p
t=0 6= Dut=0, it follows
from the independent and identically distributed funding shock  2 fp; ug jointly with
the law of large numbers that
R 
0
BD;t;i di = 
BDt . Step (ii) From the linearity in the
prot maximisation problem of banks follows that individual decisions are indepen-
dent of the distribution of collateral.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is fullled by the rst-order-necessary condition
on bond purchases by banks in the model equilibrium according to equation (C.3).
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is derived from the prot maximisation problem
of risk-neutral international investors. The expected pay-o on bonds is denoted by
Et(1  t+1), which is discounted by a risk-free interest rate rf . International investors
maximise expected returns on investment, subject to the market clearing condition on





























where the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint B
D
t is zero due to the price-taking
behaviour of investors on secondary markets. Using equation (32) yields the condition
~qt = qt, which implies a perfectly elastic supply of bonds from international investors
at a secondary market price ~qt which is identical to the primary market price qt.
Proof of Proposition 4. Denote the set of possible productivity realisations by
At 2 A and an endogenous state by nt  (Bnt ; BDt ), where n indicates dierent values
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of total debt that satisfy the condition jBnt j BDt . From state 2t 2  t follows
V dt (
2
t ; At) = U(Ct; 1  Lt)+ Et [ V ndt+1(0; 0; At+1) + (1  )V dt+1(0; 0; At+1) ]
> U(Ct; 1  Lt) + Et [ Vt+1(B2t+1; BDt+1; At+1) ] = V ndt (2t ; At):
Claim: The default value is independent of the endogenous state, i.e.
V dt (
1




t ; At)8At 2 A
Proof of Claim: The independence of equilibrium allocations under default from t
follows directly from the denition of the partial equilibrium under default in Section
3.6 in combination with the aggregate resource constraint (31).











t  0 from the market clearing condition on secondary markets (9). Conditional
on the repayment equilibrium, it follows from the aggregate resource constraint that






that satises the conditions above one obtains
Ct(
1
t ; At) < Ct(
2
t ; At). This implies from the equilibrium condition for labour supply














































where the conclusion is derived from the decreasing marginal rate of utility from con-














BDt ) 2  t8At 2 A : 2t 2
 t .
Proof of Proposition 5. This proof closely follows the steps in the proof of Propo-
sition 4.
Denote the set of possible productivity realisations by At 2 A and an endogenous
state by nt  ( Bt; BD;nt ) where n is an index for values of domestic debt. From state
2t 2  t follows
V dt (
2
t ; At) = U(Ct; 1  Lt)+ Et [ V ndt+1(0; 0; At+1) + (1  )V dt+1(0; 0; At+1) ]
> U(Ct; 1  Lt) + Et [ Vt+1( Bt+1; BD;2t+1 ; At+1) ] = V ndt (2t ; At):




t  j Btj which implies Bt + BD;1t <
Bt + B
D;2









t ; At) < Ct(
2
t ; At). This implies from the
equilibrium condition for labour supply from equation (2) that the marginal disutility
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Hence, V ndt ( Bt; B
D;2
t ; At) > V
nd
t ( Bt; B
D;1
t ; At), and therefore 
1
t = ( Bt; B
D;1
t ) 2  t8At 2
A : 2t 2  t .
Proof of Proposition 6. Given are the two choices over period t + 1 endogenous
states 1t+1  ( Bt+1; BD;1t+1), and 2t+1  ( Bt+1; BD;2t+1). From Proposition 5 follows directly
that  t+1(
1
t+1)   t+1(2t+1) 8At+1 2 A : 2t+1 2  t+1. (i) Applying the denition of the
default probability, one gets t (
2
t+1; At)  t (1t+1; At). (ii) Using the pricing equation
of international investors (27) yields qt(
2
t+1; At)  qt(1t+1; At).
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B Timeline




















exclusion from financial market
2. 4.
change over to
autarky if = 1
financial
intermediation




















j;t = (1  t)BD;pj;t + (1 + rt )j;t   (1 + rMt )Mj;t + (1 + rR)Rpj;t| {z }
 type p period t cashows, Xpj;t
 (1  t)qtBD;pj;t+1

































j;t = (1  t)BD;uj;t + (1 + rMt )Mj;t + (1 + rR)Ruj;t| {z }
 type u period t cashows, Xuj;t
 (1  t)qtBD;pj;t+1











Note that subscripts j for individual banks can be ignored due to the existence of a
representative bank for each type  2 fp; ug, according to Proposition 1.
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C.1.3 Recursive notation: Set of bank value functions
Rewrite the maximization problems of banks from (C.1) and (C.2) in recursive form
as
Wp(Bt; BDt ; At) = maxfBD;pt+1 ;t;Mt;Ret ;Rd;pt g
Dpt (Bt; B
D




Wu(Bt; BDt ; At) = maxfBD;ut+1 ;Mt;Rd;ut g
Dut (Bt; B
D
t ; At) + 
bEt
W(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1) (C.4)
Denote the expected continuation value of banks in period t under i.i.d. probability
of taking type  2 fp; ug next period as
Et




Forming the Lagrangian by combining (C.1) and (C.3):
Lp = max
fBD;pt+1 ;t;Ret ;Rd;pt g
(1  t)BD;pt + (1 + rt )t   (1 + rMt )Ret + (1 + rR)(Ret +Rd;pt )
  (1  t)qtBD;pt+1  Np + pt (Np + Ret   t  Ret  Rd;pt ) + t((1  t)BD;pt   Ret )
+ pt (R
d;p
t   0) + bEt
W(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1)+ D;pt (0 +Dpt ) + BD;pt (0 +BD;pt+1)
(C.6)
with Lagrange multipliers for the collateral constraint t, the balance sheet constraint
pt , the non-negativity constraint on the deposit facility 
p
t , dividends 
D;p
t , and collat-
eral purchases B
D;p
t , respectively. Interbank loans have been substituted.







1 + rt = 
p
t (C.7)
(1 + rR)  p = (1 + rM + t  p) (C.8)
(1 + rR) + pt = 
p
t (C.9)
(1  t)qt = bEt
WBD(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1)+ D;pt (C.10)
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with complementary slackness conditions
t(0  Mt   (1  t)BD;pt ) = 0 (C.11)
pt (0 +R
d;p
t ) = 0 (C.12)
D;pt (0 +D
p
















Forming the Lagrangian by combining (C.2) and (C.4):
Lu = max
fBD;ut+1 ;Mt;Rd;ut g
(1  t)BD;ut + (1 + rM)Mt + (1 + rR)Rd;ut   (1  t)qtBD;pt+1  Nu
+ ut (N
u  Mt  Rd;ut ) + ut (Rd;ut   0) + bEt
W(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1)
+ D;ut (0 +D
u





with Lagrange multipliers for the balance sheet constraint ut , and the non-negativity
constraints on central bank deposits ut , dividends 
D;u
t , and collateral purchases 
BD;u
t ,
respectively. We use the following functional form for 	(qt):





with rgt  q 1t   1
From the denition of the interbank rate rMt  1 + rR +	(qt), we get
rMt = 1 + r
R +  (rgt   rf )





1 + rMt = 
u
t (C.16)
(1 + rR) + ut = 
u
t (C.17)
(1  t)qt = bEt
WBD(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1)+ D;ut + BD;ut (C.18)
and the complementary slackness conditions
ut (0 +R
d;u
t ) = 0 (C.19)
D;ut (0 +D
u





















from the state space. Bond prices fqtg are taken as given. This
yields the interbank rate as
rMt = r
R +  
 
q 1t   1  rf

:
Using all static optimality conditions derived above, the following nonlinear con-

















t = WtLt (C.24)
(1  )eAtKL t = Wt(1 + rt ) (C.25)
rt   rR = [rt   rMt   t] (C.26)
rt = r
R + pt (C.27)




















t ) = 0; (C.31)
ut (0 +R
d;u





t  0; (C.33)
In case of default (t = 1), we have qt = 0 such that our collateral constraint
imposes Mt = R
e
t = 0 and r
M
t is undened. All resources of unproductive banks are
deposited at the central bank, Rd;ut = N
u. The solution to the partial equilibrium in
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Np = t +R
d;p
t
with the inequality constraint Rd;pt  0, and complementary slackness condition
pt (0 +R
d;p
t ) = 0
pt  0
C.3 Collateral choice
We use the remaining dynamic equilibrium conditions to pin down the optimal amount
of aggregate collateral holding for the consecutive period. We pin down the optimal
choice over collateral BDt+1 from the system of equations:
Np +Dpt = X
p
t   (1  t)qtBD;pt+1
Nu +Dut = X
u
t   (1  t)qtBD;ut+1
(1  t)qt = bEt











subject to the constraints
BD;t+1  0;  2 fp; ug
Dt  0;  2 fp; ug
The envelope condition is derived from bank value functions (C.3)-(C.5) and (C.6,
C.15) which yields
WBD(Bt+1; BDt+1; At+1) = p [1  t+1 + t+1] + u(1  t+1)
= 1  t+1 + pt+1
Since both types of banks have equal probabilities over funding needs in the consecutive
period, the inter-temporal optimality conditions are identical. We aggregate over
banks budget constraints in order to obtain the system of equations that pin down the
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optimal collateral choice:




t   (1  t)qtBDt+1 (C.34)
Dt = (1  t)BDt + (1 + rt )t + (1 + rR)Rt   (1  t)qtBDt+1  N
(1  t)qt = bEt [1  t+1 + pt+1] + Dt (C.35)
BDt+1 +B

t+1 +Bt+1 = 0 (C.36)
BDt+1; Dt  0 (C.37)
Note that Et[1 t+1] = 1 t . Further, denoting aggregate cashows in the nancial




t , and noting the fact that in absence of default we have t = 0,










fully described by the system











t+1 = 0 (C.39)
with the associated complementary slackness conditions















The agents' budget constraints are used to form the aggregate resource constraint in
the model economy:
Ct =WtLt +Dt + Tt +
NF
t






=(1  t)BD;pt + (1 + rt )t   (1 + rMt )Mt + (1 + rR)Rpt   (1  t)qtBD;pt+1  Np
+ (1  t)BD;ut + (1 + rMt )Mt + (1 + rR)Rut   (1  t)qtBD;ut+1  Nu




t +Bt   qtBt+1
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Summing over all agents' budget constraints, period t consumption is determined in
Ct = Yt + (t +Rt  N) + (1  t)(Bt +BDt )  (1  t)qt(Bt+1 +BDt+1)
= Yt + (1  t)(Bt +BDt )  (1  t)qt(Bt+1 +BDt+1)
D Computational strategy
The following algorithm proposes value function iteration in the discrete state space
(DSS) as a solution to this numerical problem in a two-loop algorithm.47
1. Initiate the system. Form discrete grids over the three state variables with
productivity A 2 A = GAfA1; A2; :::; Aig of size i, government bonds GB 2
B = fB1; B2; :::; Bjg of size j, and bonds held domestically as collateral GD 2 D
= fBD1 ; BD2 ; :::; BDp g of size p withB 2 B= [Bmin; Bmax], BD 2 F= [BDmin; BDmax].
Form a matrix S that represents the discrete state space and contains s = ij p
elements along the rows that represent the current state, j elements along the
columns for choice over B0, and p elements along the pages for choice over BD 0,
hence S = s j  p. Form a second matrix, S = s 1, that describes the state
under default when choices are B0 = BD 0 = 0. Note that the state space matrices
S;S do not have full rank, as all combinations that violate the condition jBj >
BD from condition (9) need to be eliminated from the state space. Initialize the
government's value functions V(0)(B;BD; A), V d(0)(B;BD; A), and V nd(0) (B;BD; A)
of size s 1, and the bank pricing schedule for government debt of size s j.
2. Calculate period t default allocations for each element in S using the system of
partial equilibrium equations under default. Note that default allocations can be
computed outside the pricing-loop as they are based on the assumption qt = 0
if t = 1.
3. Take q(0)(B
0; BD 0; A) = 1=(1 + rf ) for all combinations of current and future
states S as the initial guess for the pricing-loop.
(a) Calculate period t static allocations under repayment conditional on the
state matrix S and the bond price q(0) by using the system of partial equi-
librium equations in the repayment regime.
(b) Collateral policy:
i. Use the transition matrix 
 on the exogenous state to form expectations
about future liquidity value of government bonds, Et(t+1).
ii. Back out the optimal collateral decision for each potential choice of
total government debt B0, given current state s, denoted by BF0 j B0
= F(B;BD; A) of size s j. The optimal collateral policy follows the
optimality condition Et(~qt   qt) = 0 + Dt + BDt .
(c) Government's value functions :
47The quasi-code is presented in recursive notation in this appendix. Variables for the consecutive
period are denoted by a prime.
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i. Compute the value of household utility under repayment for each ele-
ment of S. Use the optimal collateral policy of banks F to form the
continuation value of the government.
ii. Take default decision to form the default set  (B;BD; A) = s 
1. In case of repayment, pin down optimal level of public debt B0.
Obtain updated value functions V(1)(B;BD; A), V d(1)(B;BD; A), and
V nd(1) (B;B
D; A).
iii. Iterate on government value functions until convergence is achieved.
iv. Back out the optimal debt policy of the government, consisting of the
default decision t 2 f0; 1g, and the optimal borrowing decision B0 in
case of repayment. The vector of optimal government debt policy is of
size s 1.
4. Use the default set  (B;BD; A) and the transition matrix 
 to form default
probabilities (1). Update the bond price equation. Convergence is achieved if
j q(0)   q(1) j< ". Else, update the bond price schedule q(0) = q(1) and go back to
step 3a).
E Data
- Output: Quarterly GDP at constant prices. Spain: 2000q1 - 2011q4. Belgium,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal: 2010q1-11q4.
Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts.
- Private consumption, Spain: Nominal quarterly consumption, deated by
the GDP deator, 2001q1-2011q4. Source: National Statistics Institute (INE),
Spain.
- Credit, Spain: Outstanding loans to non-nancial corporations, up to 1 year,
deated by GDP deator, 2003q1-2011q4. Source: Bank of Spain.
- Interbank loans, Spain: Deposits from domestic monetary nancial institu-
tions, Jan-2000 to Dec-2011 as a share in total liabilities. Source: Bank of Spain,
Monetary and Financial Statistics.
- Risk-free rate, Spain: EONIA swap index rate, 3 month (short-term), starting
Jun-2005 to Dec-2011. German Bund yield, 5 year (long-term), Jan-2000 to Dec-
2011. Source: Datastream.
- Sovereign spread, Spain: Spanish benchmark bond yield, 5 year, over German
Bund, 20001q1 - 2011q4. Source: Datastream.
- Credit rate, Spain: Bank lending rate to non-nancial corporations, up to 1
year, Mar-2003 to Dec-2012. (also: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal). Source: ECB.
- Interbank rate: GC repo rate, 3 month, Germany, France, Italy, Spain; 31-
Mar-2011 to 07-Dec-2011; Germany starts on 25-May-2011. Source: Bloomberg.
- Government debt: Total and domestic government debt, Spain, 2004q1 to
2013q1. Source: Arslanalp & Tsuda (2012).
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- Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio, Spain: Ratio of domestic cur-
rency holdings and deposits with the monetary authorities to claims on other
governments, nonnancial public entities, the private sector, and other banking
institutions, 2000-2011. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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